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EASTERN

F.O.

371

1947

PALESTINE

File No. 46

pp. 10385-10953

CLOSED
UNTIL

1978

61794

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E10385/46/31

E10386 - E10390

and closed until..... *1998*

*delete as necessary

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1947

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PALESTINE

10411

7 NOV

2

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10411/46/31.

M. Beards

No 10

5/11/47

4.11.47

Y ~

1st time situation, Sir ZIA-UD-DIN AHMED

transmits copy of letter from Sir Zia-ud-Din Ahmed,
M. Beards, a long that an interview be granted
to discuss the Political situation.

Last Paper

10390

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

See further paper &

separate minute (enclosed)
JO NV.13(Action
completed)

G. E. M. 11/11

(Index)

11/11/47

Next Paper

10411

38538

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Sir Zia-Uddin Ahmad called at the Foreign Office on 12th November. He explained to me that he wanted to tell us that he had done his best to explain to American officials the importance of economic help to Great Britain. He had received at Aligarh University an American whom he described rather vaguely as "an assistant of President Truman", and had pointed out to him that the United States should not give financial and economic help to Britain on a strict accounting basis, but should make a free gift in return for what Britain had done in the war.

2. As regards Palestine, Sir Zia-Uddin Ahmad emphasised that we should be very careful not to alienate the Moslem countries who were so vitally interested in the solution of this problem. I thanked him for his courtesy in calling and said that I would make a note of what he had told me. Undoubtedly the Secretary of State would appreciate the way in which he had spoken to representative Americans.

3. Sir Zia-Uddin Ahmad started talking to me about Indian problems and I asked whether he would care to speak on this subject to Mr. Murray of the South East Asia Department. He agreed and I introduced Mr. Murray to him.

Mr Murray
Private Sec.
CMA 12/xi

D. S. Beins
13th November, 1947
(BEIT 17)

Sir Zia-Uddin Ahmed impressed on me the importance of stopping the disturbances and restoring normal conditions in India and Pakistan as soon as possible. I felt that he greatly underestimated our knowledge of and concern regarding recent happenings in India and Pakistan - perhaps taking reluctance to interfere as lack of interest - and over-estimated our ability to influence the course of events.

2. He suggested that most of the present troubles arose from disputes over the position of the Indian States. What was required was a year's moratorium, during which no pressure should be brought to bear on the States which had not acceded to either Dominion; he suggested that a statement to this effect should be made in the House of Commons, and that Earl Mountbatten should be instructed not to exert his influence to force unwilling States to accede.

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
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Minutes.

3. As Kashmir and Junagadh are both obvious ~~by~~ faits-accomplis, Sir Zia-Uddin was apparently trying to rescue Hyderabad, with which I suspect he has a connexion.

4. Sir Zia-Uddin struck me as a very well-intentioned old scholar, not in very close touch with the world, nor understanding much of what is really happening in India.



Peter Murray, 18/11. 1941

JB MV-14

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10417
7 NOV

10, Downing St.
E.W.I.

4th November, 1947.

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10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

6

4th November, 1947.

Dear East,

Would you kindly advise on the terms of a
reply to be sent to the attached copy of a letter
from Sir Zia-Uddin Ahmad. I am sending a copy
of this letter to Henniker at the Foreign Office
in view of his reference to Palestine.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) P.F.R. BEARDS

K.A. East, Esq.,
Commonwealth Relations Office, India Section.

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Waldorf Hotel,
Aldwych, W.C.2.

Dear Sir,

I have come to this country to study educational system. I have just returned from America.

I have been a member of Central Legislature in India for 18 years and I am now in the Aligarh Muslim University (now in India) as Rector.

The Prime Minister is too busy a person. Will you please grant me an opportunity to see you. I want particularly to speak to you about Palestine. We should not act as Police for U.N.O. and get the odium of Muslim countries. Palestine division will lead to bloodshed in the same manner as in India. Actions are always judged by the results and not by logic.

You may communicate the substance of our conversation to the Prime Minister.

Yours truly,

(sgd) Sir Zia-Uddin Ahmad.

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Eastern Dept
CM/CA. 9/xi. 8
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

15th November, 1947.

My dear John,

... I enclose in original a letter which has been received here from Sir Zis-Madin Almad, which was the subject of Paul Leards' letter to East on the 15th November (a copy of which was sent to you) and about which we have spoken since.

... John Keith agrees that it would be appropriate for a member of the Eastern Department to speak to Sir Zis-Madin Almad, and I enclose a copy of our reply to Sir Zis-Madin Almad telling him of this.

Yours ever,
Laurie Pumphrey.

J.M.E. Walker, Esq., M.P.,
Foreign Office.

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9

6th November, 1947.

Dear Sir,

I write in reply to your letter of the
3rd November.

Perhaps your best course would be to
call upon the Foreign Office to express your
views. I have no doubt that if you were to
get in touch with Mr. Beith of the Foreign
Office he would be able to arrange an
interview.

Yours truly,

Sir Zia-Uddin Ahmad, C.I.E.

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Telegrams "WALDORFIUS" LONDON.
Telephone: TEMPLE BAR 2400.

WALDORF HOTEL,
ALDWYCH, W.C.2.

3-11-1947

Dear Sir,

I have come to this
country to study the situation of the
I have just returned from
America.

I have been a member of the
Legation = since for 18 years & I
am now in the British Mission
Unit - (no = dia) as Rector.

The British Mission is to bring
a person. Will you please grant
me an opportunity to see you. I
want - particularly to speak to you
about - Palestine. We should not
act - as Police for U.N.O &
get a vision of - Muslim
Question. Palestine division will
lead to bloodshed = a very
monstrous as in India

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 for my ~~Amir~~ - the Sultan of the ~~Amir~~
 the Amir ~~Amir~~ of the ~~Amir~~

St. U. St. ~~St~~ Lia Uddi Ahmad

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FO 371 / 61794

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<p>158</p>	<p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<p>E10434 / G</p> <p>12</p>
<p>E10434 / 46 / C</p> <p>Mr. Beeler</p> <p>New York</p> <p>to Mr. Bulwos</p> <p>Dated 1 Nov</p> <p>Received 4 Nov</p>	<p>H.M.C.'s policy to Palestine:</p> <p>Situation at New York</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p> <p>E10380</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p> <p>Attach out tel. 13 Nov. 7</p>	
<p>References</p> <p>E10194 / 46 / C</p> <p>E10213 / 95 / 31</p> <p>E10091 / 95 / 31</p> <p>E9994 / 95 / 31</p> <p>E10034 / 46 / C</p> <p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>Del. U.K. del.</p> <p>New York</p> <p>no. 3780.</p> <p>Nov. 5th.</p> <p>Rpd. w/ton 11455.</p>		
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>25 107</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>W.H.</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>		

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Please see below Mr Beeley's letter of Nov 1, which is very disquieting, particularly the P.S. This seems to make it imperative for a formal statement to be made on the lines of our tel. No 3737.

The C.O. are reluctant to send a reply to New York tel. No 3176 until Mr Birch-Jones returns, but I think we can deal with the two main points in it in some tel.

I attach a draft. I have sent a copy to C.O. & will get their views early to-morrow.

Bob Burrows

I am sure that a 4x1 tel on these lines is very necessary in view of the indefinite attitude adopted by the Colonial Secretary & by his instructions & not restating in

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I readily accept to have Sam track Jones before this by & arrange something soon
4/10

Discussed with the S.F.S. and settled. Tel. agreed by S.F.S.
P.J.D. 5/11

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in my ~~own~~ name a
should tell saying that
the Deeler's statement
a Cont- 2 represented
our views were accurate
the but Martin's is Cont-
L. I think this should

But I think this should
be now reinforced by the
view now submitted in
Mr Beeley's letter
now received.

898 Aug 7 Nov 4

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1 2

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73000 7 NOV 1947 61002
 E10434 15
 UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
 NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

TELEPHONE:
 LONGACRE 5-2070

REPLIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
 P. O. Box 304
 NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

SECRET & PERSONAL

1st November, 1947.

Dear Bernard

10013 10021 4997 E10197
 I was greatly relieved by Foreign Office telegram No. 3737. You will have noticed from our telegrams No. 3102 and No. 3063 as compared with No. 3155 that there has been some difference of emphasis in the replies given by Martin on one Sub-Committee and by myself on the other. The Colonial Secretary took the line that our attitude should be as non-committal as possible at this stage, and it was in accordance with his instructions that Martin spoke as he did in commenting on the United States proposal in Sub-Committee 1. He also felt that this attitude was justified by paragraph 3 of Foreign Office telegram No. 3703. E10084

When asked on Sub-Committee 2 to comment on the Arab proposals, I had previously felt justified in taking a more definitely negative line, and this seemed to be confirmed by the first two sentences of paragraph 5 of Foreign Office telegram No. 3703. While Martin was speaking in the first Sub-Committee on the morning of the 31st October, I was repeating in the second Sub-Committee the assertion that the Colonial Secretary's statement of His Majesty's Government's policy had introduced the new factor into the Palestine situation, and that any proposals that left this factor out of account were to that extent unrealistic. I felt bound to make it clear to the Sub-Committee that the mandatory would not be prepared to play the part allotted to it in the Arab plan unless the consent of the Jews to that plan had first been obtained.

I hope I am right in interpreting Foreign Office telegram

/No.

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.
 Eastern Department
 Foreign Office
 London, S.W.1.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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No.3737 as meaning that we should just as unequivocally warn the Assembly against supposing that we would be prepared to play the part allotted to us in the latest proposal of the United States. At the moment of writing there is a good deal of doubt here on this point as is shown by the following quotations from this morning's New York press:

"Despite Mr. Martin's statement members of the committee said they believed that Great Britain had already agreed in principle to continue its administration of Palestine until partition took effect. Lewis Douglas, United States Ambassador to London, is known to have discussed the question with British authorities earlier in the week."
(New York Times.)

"U.S. spokesman insisted that in the end the United Kingdom would approve the proposal no matter what Creech-Jones may or may not have said, U.S. optimism was so pronounced and persistent that the way was left open for inference that the U.S. and Britain had come to some private agreement on the matter."
(P.M.)

Yours ever,

Harold

(H. Beeley)

PS. (2nd November). Our telegram no 3128 had not been distributed here when I dictated the above. Michael Wright telephoned me this morning to say that the conversation recorded in this telegram had played a large part in deciding the Americans to present their proposals to the Sub-committee here. He also says that his own statements on Palestine are ^{now} being brushed aside in

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Washington on the ground that the Colonial
Scout's views are more recent and more
authoritative.

All this underlines the need for a clear and explicit statement of our position not only to Delegations (your telegram no. 3737, last sentence of para. 1) but also to the Sub-committee.

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No. E10434/46/9

18

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

F. O.,

November 5 1947.

Despatched 2.30 P. M.

B. A. B. B.
Draft.

U. K. Delegation,
New York.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET Conf.
GIANT

Telegram.

Following for Cadogan.

No. 3780

I presume that you are now in charge

(Date) Nov. 5th.

of Palestine discussions.

Repeat to :—

2. Judging from sub-committee dis-

Washington 1155
(Immediate)
Jerusalem

cussions and reports of United States press
reactions, we do not seem to have made it

by any means clear that we cannot accept

American proposals and I suggest that the

earliest possible opportunity should be

taken to make in the sub-committees and any

other manner you think suitable firm and

short statements on the lines of my telegram

No. 3737 [of November 1st]. Early oppor-

tunity should also be taken to correct these

mis-statements and misleading implications

in U.S. statement reported in your telegram

No. 3151 [of October 31st]. I refer

particularly to suggestion that we are

responsible for law and order until the

termination of the mandate, with the

suggestion that the mandate cannot be

relinquished until some other authority

is set up, and to the suggestion that

arrangements suggested by the U.S.A. can be

"geared in with" our plans for withdrawal.

Any attempt to carry out these arrangements

would of course immensely complicate and

prolong our withdrawal.

Ex-Star.
Code
Cypher.

Distribution :—

World Organisation

Under which we
are responsible for
law and order

Copies to :—

RECEIVED
7 NOV 1947
4/11
SENT TO DEPT.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(13556) Wt. 43697-140 100m 347 G.S.S. Cp 620

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The diagram shows a ruler with two scales. The top scale is marked from 1 to 6. The bottom scale is marked from 1 to 2. The ruler is divided into 10 equal segments by vertical lines.

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FO 371 61794

as/

as I anticipated in the last paragraph of my telegram No. 3737. It is for this reason all the more important to make the statements I have suggested above to kill this rumour once and for all.



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3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

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Confidential.

CYPHER/CTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3,780.

D: 2.25 p.m. 5th November, 1947.

5th November, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington No. 11455 (Immediate),
Jerusalem.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

GIANT

Following for Cadogan.

I presume that you are now in charge of Palestine discussions.

2. Judging from sub-committee discussions and reports of United States press reactions, we do not seem to have made it by any means clear that we cannot accept American proposals and I suggest that the earliest possible opportunity should be taken to make in the sub-committees and in any other manner you think suitable firm and short statements on the lines of my telegram No. 3,737 [of November 1st]. Early opportunity should also be taken to correct mis-statements and misleading implications in United States statement reported in your telegram No. 3,151 [of October 31st]. I refer particularly to suggestion that the mandate under which we are responsible for law and order cannot be relinquished until some other authority is set up, and to the suggestion that arrangements proposed by the United States can be "geared in with" our plans for withdrawal. Any attempt to carry out these arrangements would of course immensely complicate and prolong our withdrawal.

3. We do not feel that we can safely refrain from making the above direct comments on the United States proposals in the hope that they will eventually fail to secure a two-thirds majority.

4. I recognise the motive of the United States authorities in putting forward their proposal, namely to avoid the necessity for an international authority and an international force, in both of which Russia or her satellites would participate. But it must be made absolutely clear to the Americans that they cannot frighten us with this bogey into assuming responsibility ourselves for enforcing partition.

/The

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5. There does not seem at present to be any great need for us to comment on the Russian statement. It does not seem to us to make any concrete approach to the problem of enforcement. The arrangement they suggest is no doubt calculated to leave the situation open for as long as possible and to give them the maximum opportunity for intriguing with "democratic parties and social organisations".

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<p>155</p>	<p>Palestine EASTERN</p>	<p>E10442 /G 23 12 NOV 1947</p>
<p>E10442 /46/C New York 3238 Dated 6 Nov Received 7 Nov</p>	<p>H.M.C.'s attitude to Palestine question: Possible statements in New York</p>	
<p>Last Paper. E10436</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p>	
<p>References. E10434 /46/C</p>	<p>PAB 11.11</p>	
<p>(Print.)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of.) Min to P.H. /46/104 10 Nov. Tel New York 3802 11 Nov. Rpd W'bn 11657 Cairo 2087 Bagdad 979 Rasht 697 Damascus 576 Tedd 460 Amman 492 BMEo. 808</p>		
<p>(Action completed.) 25/11</p>	<p>(Index.) W.H.</p>	<p>Next Paper.</p>

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F10442E

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3238

6th November, 1947.

D. 7.58 p.m. 6th November, 1947.

R. 1.39 a.m. 7th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington

IMMEDIATE
SECRET
GIANT

10442
7 NOV

Following from Cadogan.

Your telegram No. 3780.

I confirm that I have taken over charge of Palestine matters since Colonial Secretary's departure.

2. I believe that correct interpretation of our statements and their application to the American proposals is now generally understood both among delegations and by the press, i.e. that we could not (repeat not) undertake the role implied by these proposals of maintaining order with British troops during the process of implementing partition plan. In view of subsequent Soviet suggestions and of clearer understanding of our position United States proposals seem now in fact largely to have receded into the background. Any opportunity which presents itself will be taken to remove any lingering doubts (on lines indicated by your telegram), but there is no immediate occasion for a public statement since the sub-committee stands adjourned pending outcome of discussions of working group and will not meet today or probably tomorrow. It is impracticable to draft precise terms of any statement until we know position resulting from these discussions to which it must necessarily relate. I propose, however, in conversation with Herschel Johnson to make absolutely clear to him that our attitude is as stated above and that the fact that we raised no objection to his making his statement on 31st October did not imply anything else. If question arises in discussions with other delegations we shall of course speak on similar lines.

3. As regards our attitude generally, although it is proper for His Majesty's Government, having submitted the Palestine problem to the United Nations, to await the verdict of the General Assembly and also reasonable that we should see the nature of their plan as a whole before declaring our attitude to it, there would be advantage now in attempting to reach some less negative position, at least in our own minds.

/Point

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-2-

Point which Colonial Office representatives here suggest it would be helpful to establish, is whether in the absence of any arrangements for military contingents from other member States (which incidentally-apart from other difficulties - it might be impracticable to organise without unacceptable delay) we should

(i) withdraw in a matter of days into Haifa and renounce all responsibility for law and order in the rest of Palestine (even if it involves refusal to intervene if massacres are taking place, e.g. in the valley of Esdraelon a few miles away) or

(ii) withdraw by geographical stages phased over a period of months, retaining responsibility for law and order in the areas from which we have not withdrawn. Second alternative may be forced upon us in any event by practical difficulties of more rapid withdrawal. Its adoption would be bound to shape the course of events during this period and to this extent we shall be forced to "play a part" whether we wish to or not. By withdrawing first from predominantly Arab and Jewish areas which are not contiguous (e.g. Jewish coastal area immediately round Tel Aviv and the 100 per cent Arab area of the sub-districts of Nablus, Jenin and Ramallah), which need not complicate our withdrawal, we could leave in each a vacuum in which Jewish and Arab authorities could establish themselves and consolidate their position in preparation for expansion into other areas as we progressively withdrew. In such circumstances it is conceivable that some accommodation might be reached between the Arab and Jewish authorities regarding frontiers before the next stage of withdrawal. If by this or any other means we can, without thereby unduly increasing our responsibilities during the process, so arrange our withdrawal so as to reduce prospect of disorder and bloodshed ensuing upon our departure, we are surely under an obligation to do so.

4. I should appreciate an early reply both on this subject and to the question asked in our telegram No. 3226.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 157.

[Copy sent to C.R.O. Downing Street for repetition to Jerusalem]

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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Copy to:
Colonial Secretary
Minister of
Defence
Cabinet Office

In accordance with the conclusions of the Defence Committee meeting on November 7th, I have discussed with the Colonial Secretary the best way of announcing our decision about withdrawal from Palestine. I attach a draft telegram to Sir A. Cadogan in New York in which the Colonial Secretary concurs.

We understand that the main Palestine Committee is to resume its discussions to-morrow and it may therefore be most desirable that Sir A. Cadogan should make a statement of our intentions to-morrow. I very much hope therefore that we can get this draft telegram off to-day.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Defence.

10th November, 1947

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FO 371 61794

12 NOV 1947

P.M./47/164.

PRIME MINISTER.

In accordance with the conclusions of the Defence Committee meeting on November 7th, I have discussed with the Colonial Secretary the best way of announcing our decision about withdrawal from Palestine. I attach a draft telegram to Sir Alexander Cadogan in New York in which the Colonial Secretary concurs.

2. We understand that the main Palestine Committee is to resume its discussions to-morrow and it may therefore be most desirable that Sir Alexander Cadogan should make a statement of our intentions to-morrow. I very much hope therefore that we can get this draft telegram off to-day.

3. I am sending copies of this minute to the Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Defence.

(Sd.) ERNEST BEVIN

10th November, 1947.

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enter E/K

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Registry
No.

Handwritten initials

Draft
New York.

Telegram
No.

Date.

Repeat to:
WASHINGTON.

JERUSALEM.

CAIRO.

BAGDAD.

BEIRUT.

DAMASCUS.

JEDDA.

AMMAN.

B.M.E.O.

Cypher
Distribution:

World
Organisation.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Despatched

M.

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

Your telegram No. 323~~48~~ of November
6th: Palestine⁷.

The Defence Committee of the Cabinet
have now considered the date of our withdrawal
from Palestine and have taken the decisions set
out in the following paragraph. I must leave
it to your discretion to decide when and how much
of these decisions you should reveal in a
statement at the United Nations. From what the
Colonial Secretary has told me and judging
from the Minister of State's personal and
confidential letter of November 4th, the
Palestine question may remain for some time in
the Sub-Committee, which may not be the right
place or occasion for a statement on the lines
of our new decisions. Great discretion must
therefore be used as to the timing and the
substance. There is a danger that we shall
give ourselves away with no counter-advantage,
if we make our statement prematurely. I should
see no objection to your informing both the
Dominion and the United States representatives
of the substance of our decision whenever you
judge fit.

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2.

Registry
No.

~~XXXXXX~~
Secret.
~~XXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXX~~
~~XXXX~~

Draft.

New York.

Telegram.

No.

(Date)

Repeat to :—

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Jerusalem

Cairo

Bagdad

Beirut

Damascus

Jedda

Amman

B.M.E.O.

~~XXXXXX~~

~~XXXX~~

Cypher.

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World Organisation

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(13556) Wt. 43697-140 100m 3147 G.S.St. Gp 620

F.O.,

November 1947.

Despatched

M.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

GIANT

Your telegram No. 32378 [of November 6th: Palestine].

The Defence Committee of the Cabinet have now considered the date of our withdrawal from Palestine and have taken the decisions set out in the following paragraph. You have discretion to make a statement on these lines at whatever time you think most appropriate. We recognise that this may not be until Sub-Committees have finished their work and Full Committee resumes. If you think it desirable, you should inform U.S. representatives of our decision in advance of public statement.

2. The Colonial Secretary in his statements of September 25th and October 16th gave a clear general indication of H.M.G.'s policy. That policy remains unmodified but

we recognise that it is now desirable that

~~at the appropriate moment~~
~~the Committee should know~~ rather more of

our plans regarding withdrawal. ~~In the~~

Colonial Secretary's statements, it was made clear that if there was agreement between the Jews and Arabs, then our experience and

Administration would be available to help them ~~take steps to that~~
to implement the agreement.

We are now asked
what/

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what we will do in the absence of such an agreement. The answer is that our authorities have been directed to plan for the final withdrawal of our Administration and troops from Palestine to be completed by August 1st, 1948. This does not by any means imply that we shall continue to be administratively responsible in Palestine, or that we shall maintain law and order there until August 1st, nor does it imply that during this period our forces and Administration can be used for enforcing a settlement which is not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. On the contrary, we reserve the right to lay down the Mandate and to bring our civil administration to an end at any time after it has become clear to us that the Assembly has failed to provide an agreed settlement. After bringing the Mandate and the Administration to an end, our forces would take no action except such as was directed towards their own withdrawal and the withdrawal of our stores, i.e. they would not be responsible for maintaining law and order (except as necessary for their own protection) or for any of the other normal attributes of government. Our decision when to bring the Mandate and the civil administration to an end will depend on the nature of the settlement which U.N.O. recommend and the probable effects of this recommendation on the inhabitants of Palestine and of neighbouring countries. The only conditions on which, failing an agreed settlement, we would be prepared to defer the termination of the Mandate and the Administration until a date near to that on which all our

troops/

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3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

32

- (a) HMG should have good reason to believe
we should be satisfied that there
were going to be no ~~serious~~ dis-
turbances in Palestine;
- (b) the status quo, including all existing
laws, would continue as before;
- (c) all attempts at illegal immigration
definitely
should have/ceased.

3. For your own information, a more detailed appreciation is now being prepared of the practical steps necessary to effect withdrawal, and our decision ^{as to} ~~on~~ the end ^{ing} of the Mandate and civil administration may ^{to a certain} ~~naturally~~ ^{extend to} be influenced by the conclusions of this appreciation.

4. The question raised in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference will require further consideration in the light of detailed plans to be produced for withdrawal. It does not in any case affect the general outline given above.

5. I am replying separately to your telegram No. 3226 [of November 6th: provision of British forces for Security Council].



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34

statements of September 25th and October 16th gave a clear general indication of H.M.G.'s policy. That policy remains unmodified but we recognise that it is now desirable that at the appropriate moment rather more of our plans regarding withdrawal should be revealed. In the Colonial Secretary's statements, it was made clear that if there was agreement between the Jews and Arabs, then our experience and Administration would be available to help them to implement the agreement. We stand by that. We are now asked what we will do in the absence of such an agreement. The answer is that our authorities have been directed to plan for the final withdrawal of our Administration and troops from Palestine to be completed by August 1st, 1948. This does not by any means imply that we shall continue to be administratively responsible in Palestine, or that we shall maintain law and order there until August 1st, nor does it imply that during this period our forces and Administration can be used for enforcing a settlement which is not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. On the contrary we reserve the right to lay down the Mandate and to bring our civil administration to an end at any time after it has become clear to us that the Assembly has failed to provide an agreed settlement. After bringing the Mandate and the Administration to an end, our forces would take no action except such as was directed towards their own withdrawal and the withdrawal of our stores, i.e. they would not be responsible for maintaining law and order (except as necessary for their/

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3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

35

their own protection) or for any of the other normal attributes of government. Our decision when to bring the Mandate and the civil administration to an end will depend on the nature of the settlement which U.N.O. recommend and the probable effects of this recommendation on the inhabitants of Palestine and of neighbouring countries. The only conditions on which, failing an agreed settlement, we would be prepared to defer the termination of the Mandate and the Administration until a date near to that on which all our troops could be withdrawn are that:-

- (a) H.M.G. should have good reason to believe that there were going to be no disturbances in Palestine;
- (b) the status quo, including all existing laws, would continue as before;
- (c) all attempts at illegal immigration should have definitely ceased.

3. For your own information, a more detailed appreciation is now being prepared of the practical steps necessary to effect withdrawal, and our decision as to the ending of the Mandate and civil administration may to a certain extent be also influenced by the conclusions of this appreciation.

4. The question raised in paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference will require further consideration in the light of/

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[CAIRO ONLY. Please pass to B.N. E.O.
to my file no.]

20/1

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37

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

(To the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

11th November, 1947. D. 7. 45 p.m. 11th November, 1947.

Jerusalem

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Beirut No. 697

Damascus No. 576

Jedda No. 460

Amman No. 492

Cairo B.M.E.O. No. 808

GIANT

The Defence Committee of the Cabinet have now considered the date of our withdrawal from Palestine and have taken the decisions set out in the following paragraph. I must leave it to your discretion to decide when and how much of these decisions you should reveal in a statement at the United Nations.

From what the Colonial Secretary has told me and judging from the Minister of State's personal and confidential letter of November 4th, the Palestine question may remain for some time in the Sub-Committee, which may not be the right place or occasion for a statement on the lines of our new decisions. Great discretion must therefore be used as to the timing and the substance. There is a danger that we shall give ourselves away with no counter-advantage, if we make our statement prematurely. I should see no objection to your informing both the Dominion and the United States representatives of the substance of our decision whenever you judge fit.

2. The Colonial Secretary in his statements of September 25th and October 16th gave a clear general indication of His Majesty's Government's policy. That policy remains unmodified but we recognise that it is now desirable that at the appropriate moment rather more of our plans regarding withdrawal should be revealed. In the Colonial Secretary's

/statements

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61794

statements, it was made clear that if there was agreement between the Jews and Arabs, then our experience and Administration would be available to help them to implement the agreement. We stand by that. We are now asked what we will do in the absence of such an agreement.

The answer is that our authorities have been directed to plan for the final withdrawal of our Administration and troops from Palestine to be completed by August 1st, 1948. This does not by any means imply that we shall continue to be administratively responsible in Palestine, or that we shall maintain law and order there until August 1st, nor does it imply that during this period our forces and Administration can be used for enforcing a settlement which is not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. On the contrary we reserve the right to lay down the Mandate and bring our civil administration to an end at any time after it has become clear to us that the Assembly has failed to provide an agreed settlement. After bringing the Mandate and the Administration to an end, our forces would take no action except such as was directed towards their own withdrawal and the withdrawal of our stores, i.e. they would not be responsible for maintaining law and order (except as necessary for their own protection) or for any of the other normal attributes of government. Our decision when to bring the Mandate and the civil administration to an end will depend on the nature of the settlement which United Nations recommend and the probable effects of this recommendation on the inhabitants of Palestine and of neighbouring countries. The only conditions on which, failing an agreed settlement, we would be prepared to defer the termination of the Mandate and the Administration until a date near to that on which our troops could be withdrawn are that:-

- (a) His Majesty's Government should have good reason to believe that there were going to be no disturbances in Palestine;
- (b) the status quo, including all existing laws, would continue as before;
- (c) all attempts at illegal immigration should have definitely ceased.

3. For your own information, a more detailed appreciation is now being prepared of the practical steps necessary to effect withdrawal, and our decision as to the ending of the Mandate and civil administration may to a certain extent be also influenced by the conclusions of this appreciation.

/4. The

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4. The question raised in paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference will require further consideration in the light of detailed plans to be produced for withdrawal. It does not in any case affect the general outline given above.

5. I am replying separately to your telegram No. 3228 [of November 6th: provision of British forces for Security Council].

[Cairo only. Please pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 808.]

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No. E10442/46/2

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

UKDEL, NEW YORK

No. 3815
(Date) Nov. 7.

HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR PALESTINE

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Distribution :—

Colonial Office
(Mr. Trafford
Smith
Mr. Higham
Mr. Holmer)
Cabinet Office
Commander Evershed
M.I. 5.
Mr. Scherr
Admiralty
Mr. G. G. B. Dodds 12/11

OUT FILE

F. O.,

IMPORTANT D
CONFIDENTIAL

~~Despatched~~

1947.

M.

Following for Martin from Trafford
Smith, Colonial Office. / Begins.

Parliamentary Question for oral reply
on 19th November asks "if Secretary of State
will make a statement setting out the facts
known to H.M.G. concerning the financing and
organisation of illegal immigration into
Palestine". We have consulted Foreign
Office who agree there would be advantage in
such a statement since ^{no} ~~nothing~~ comprehensive
official statement
has been issued since the setting up of
Cyprus camps. ~~We think however that a
statement made in U.N. would be more effective~~
^{We}
~~and~~ and should be glad to know whether you expect
to be able to use material referred to in
Foreign Office telegram to New York No. 3709
[of 29th October]. If so is statement likely
to be made before November 19th? [Ends.]

JB nov. 7

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OUT FILE

41

UKDEL, NEW YORK

Following for Martin from Trafford
Smith, Colonial Office. Begins.

Parliamentary Question for oral reply
on 19th November asks "if Secretary of State
will make a statement setting out the facts
known to H.M.G. concerning the financing and
organisation of illegal immigration into
Palestine". We have consulted Foreign
Office who agree there would be advantage in
such a statement since nothing comprehensive
has been issued since the setting up of
Cyprus camps. We think however that a
statement made in U.N. would be more effective
and should be glad to know whether you expect
to be able to use material referred to in
Foreign Office telegram to New York No. 3709
of 29th October. If so is statement likely
to be made before November 19th. Ends.

HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR PALESTINE

Colonial Office
(Mr. Trafford
Smith
Mr. Higham
Mr. Holmer)
Cabinet Office
Commander Evershed
M.I.5.
Mr. Scherr
Admiralty
Mr. G. C. B. Dodds

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

7th November, 1947

D. 1. 50p.m. 7th November, 1947.

Palestine

CONFIDENTIAL

[Begins]

[Ends]

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10447

43

1947

PALESTINE

7 NOV

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10447/46/31

P. Q

Mr. Medlicott

5, Nov

7 -

Barnet Mission School: Haifa
Mr. Medlicott. asked whether the Jewish Community
in Palestine have been asked to make available
alternative quarters for the police now occupying
the Barnet Mission School at Haifa, so that the
school may be released for its proper purpose,
the education of Arab children. Mr. Ross Williams
stated that the US satisfied that no other
accommodation is suitable and urgent necessity for
retention of the school.

Last Paper.

10442

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

JB NOV-8

(Action
completed.)

G. E. M. 4/1

(Incl.)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

E 10471

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:

FO371/61794

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EASTERN

44
✓

Parliamentary Question

LN *193. Mr. Medlicott.—To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether the Jewish community in Palestine have been asked to make available alternative quarters for the police, now occupying the Carmel Mission School at Haifa, so that the school may be released for its proper purpose, namely, the education of Arab children, thousands of whom are at present being deprived of any school life. [Wednesday 5th November.]

Norfolk E.

ANSWERED 5 NOV 1947
REPLY ATTACHED.

(203)

F.O. ARE NOT ASKED TO ADVISE.

Answer reply

JB 10 147

7 NOV

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45'

RECEIVED IN O.B.
7 NOV 1947
SENT TO DEPT.
17 - NOV 1947

PALESTINE

34. Mr. Medlicott asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Jewish community in Palestine have been asked to make available alternative quarters for the police, now occupying the Carmel Mission School at Haifa, so that the school may be released for its proper purpose, namely, the education of Arab children, thousands of whom are at present being deprived of any school life.

Mr. Rees-Williams: No such request has been made since the Palestine Government are satisfied, after exhaustive inquiries, that there is no other accommodation near the East Haifa police station which is suitable for billeting British police under present conditions. My right hon. Friend and the High Commissioner greatly regret the necessity for the retention of the Carmel Mission School under requisition.

5 NOV 1947

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47

En Clair

D. 10th November, 1947.
R. 10th " " 15.45 hrs.

Addressed to UKDEL New York, No. 1531.
Repeated to S. of S.

I confirm that our telegram No. 1519 to UKDEL refers to UKDEL telegram No. 3176 to Foreign Office.

Foreign Office

→ Communications Dept.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

INWARD TELEGRAM

Flour

8 NOV 1947

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D.5th November, 1947.

R.5th " " 17.57 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2085 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed U.K.D.E.L. for Martin No. 1519.

Repeated to the S. of S. (please pass to U.K.D.E.L.)

Reference your telegram No. 2675.

I have following comments to make looking at question from angle of Palestine Government during period before final withdrawal takes place.

2. (a) In the event of a two thirds majority in the Assembly for partition the Arabs will almost certainly resist its implementation even if they do not make trouble before steps to implement it are taken. Unless therefore His Majesty's Government change their minds presumably they will refuse to take any part in such implementation. At the same time it should be stated here that General Officer Commanding considers that up to 1st April, next year, he has in fact sufficient forces to deal with any trouble the Arabs may make in this event. It has always been his view that he can deal with either Arabs or Jews at one time, but not both. In the event of partition he would only have to deal with Arabs, with possible exception of some Jewish terrorism, which in view of Jews' own actions against it would be a commitment which he could accept at the same time. This situation would change after 1st April, unless present plans to run-down strength of troops are changed.

(b)/

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RECEIVED C.B.

(b) Assuming, nevertheless, that His Majesty's Government have no intention of assisting in implementation of partition, then it is considered that no steps could be taken towards implementation even by a U.N.O. Commission as long as administration and British troops remain in control of the country for, owing in main to necessity for keeping communications open, it would be impossible for troops not to get involved in disorders which ensue. It would appear therefore that a solution under these conditions would be for us to maintain status quo until we go and that we should then be replaced by a U.N.O. High Commission with teeth. If U.N.O. were to recommend an increased quota of Jewish immigration it would probably be in our own interests not to resist modification of status quo in this respect.

3. (a) If on the other hand partition does not get necessary two-thirds majority in U.N.O. and no other solution is adopted at this session we will presumably persist in our intention to leave. I feel in this case that our aim should be to secure set-up of a U.N.O. authority to whom we can transfer responsibility in Palestine. To walk out leaving chaos must be surely a last resort. From our point of view it would mean His Majesty's Government having to take over liabilities of the Palestine Government and losing their own fixed assets in Palestine, quite apart from enmity we would incur from the people themselves.

(b) If it is agreed under these conditions that our aim should be to hand over to U.N.O. authority, it is for consideration at what period such an authority should be established in Palestine and how transfer should take place. I am clear the sooner that some means can be found of trying U.N.O. into the Palestine problem actually in Palestine the better it will be for all concerned, and would be quite willing to accept at once an impartial U.N.O. Commission who would come initially as observers but to whom power could be eventually handed over according as to how situation developed during our withdrawal. I do not feel that British troops could be put under their control but as the situation clarified it might be possible to continue to assist them with our administration and police until they were in a position to form their own Government and Police Force from such sources as are approved by Assembly.

(c)/

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FO 371 / 61794

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INWARD TELEGRAM

50

(c) It seems under any plan that an international City of Jerusalem will be established under an U.N.O. Commission and this might well constitute first step towards realization of complete authority over the whole country.

4. It is with the above ideas in mind that I have studied your telegram and would agree that there seems at this stage no need to clarify our position further. The American proposals envisage establishment of U.N.O. Commission here and it may well be that they had in mind some such development as above.

5. In regard to your paragraph 7, the difficulty I foresee in this type of withdrawal is that we should be accused of defending boundaries of Jewish State against an Arab attack.

6. I should add with reference to Foreign Office telegram paragraph 2, that I feel an announcement of date of beginning of our withdrawal would have little significance. As already stated I feel that withdrawal of Government will be on a geographical and not a functional basis and administration will therefore remain as a whole until it is terminated. In so far as the Army is concerned withdrawal is already taking place. Owing to run-down of troops, units are continually in process of disappearing.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for onward transmission)

Distributed to:-

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Foreign Office

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson
Mr. Burrows.

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1947 156	Palestine EASTERN	E1050Y /G 57 20 NOV 1947
E1050Y /46/G New York 3270 Dated 8 Nov Received 10 Nov	H.M.C.'s policy to Palestine	
Last Paper. E104Y,	(Minutes.) Reply has been sent.	
References.	PAR 13 13-11	
(Print.)		
(How disposed of.)		
(Action completed.) 2F 14/11	(Index.) WGA	
Next Paper.		

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52

DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

D.12.25 a.m. 9th November, 1947.

R. 6.55 a.m. 9th November, 1947.

Ε10207

LIGHT

TOP SECRET

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Subject:

FO 371

61794

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/6. In the

(I) A recommendation providing for no (repeat no) non-British means of enforcing it; or

(II) No recommendation at all.

6. In the former case the recommendation might be made exclusively to the United Kingdom which would be left alone to accept or reject it. More probably some kind of United Nations commission would be nominated to supervise the process of transition in Palestine. It would be assumed that the British forces, so long as they remained in the country, would co-operate with the commission and on that assumption they would inevitably become involved in enforcement of the Assembly's recommendation.

7. As we see it here, the fact has to be faced that we cannot withdraw from Palestine without in some way influencing by the manner of our withdrawal the subsequent course of events in that country. If for example we withdraw by territorial stages, our choice of the areas to be evacuated first will materially affect both the prospects for partition and the probable frontiers of a Jewish State. Nor do I think (whatever our intention may be) that we could afford completely to disregard all the disturbances which may be expected to occur during our withdrawal, if they did not directly impede the process of withdrawal.

8. If my argument is sound, the choice with which we are now faced is between withdrawing in our own way (thereby influencing the future of Palestine but without being branded as the instrument of any United Nations decision) and withdrawing in the presence of a United Nations commission with which we should be expected to co-operate and with which I think we could not avoid co-operating to some extent. Not only the American but also the Soviet proposal, or any compromise which may be reached between them, would, if we accepted it, draw us into the position of the sole enforcing agency and so defeat what has been a major objective of our policy.

9. In these circumstances it seems essential to decide whether it would suit us better for the Assembly to make a recommendation or to fail to do so. If we would prefer not to have any recommendation of the kind that now seems likely, how far should we go in using our influence against any such scheme that might emerge? We might say that it is unrealistic to plan partition or any other scheme unless account is taken of the necessity to provide means of implementing it. We might then refer to the conditions laid down in our original statement and say that therefore we could have no part in enforcing the scheme. That should be sufficient to prevent its adoption. But in saying this we might add that if nevertheless the Assembly by a two-thirds majority approved any such solution we would not take any action contrary to it.

10. If on the other hand we are to continue along our present line of waiting for the Assembly to reach a conclusion without departing from our attitude of neutrality, I suggest that we should make a statement at a suitable opportunity indicating as clearly as possible the limitations upon the activities of our troops that we should contemplate. This would reduce the risks indicated in paragraph 7 above without however eliminating them altogether.

/11. The Commonwealth

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 161.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office
for repetition.]

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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E 10525

1947

PALESTINE

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Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10525/46/31

Embassy

Prague

31/11/2

6/Nov

11 -

WOLF SIKKERSTEIN, efforts of.

Ref. Prague at 1016 (E10031/46/31) Transmitted
copy of letter to H/C Political of 6 Nov. enclosing
list of several efforts of late in Silberstein
which were sent to front of Political

Last Paper.

10508

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, b.O.
Pa R.
Nov. 12

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

7/11/48

9/11/48

Next Paper.

E 10536

(Minutes.)

Copy to Co. refile.

for p. a. r.

JBmr. 11

g.p.p. 60 - 75009/1046 20/11

JBmr. 24

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31/4/2

E 56

HIS Majesty's Vice Consul at Prague
presents his compliments to Consular Dept., F.O.
and has the honour to transmit to him the under mentioned
documents. for onward transmission

British Embassy,

Consular Section, NOV
Prague

6th November, 1947...

Reference to previous correspondence: 10021/46 E

Prague telegram No. 1016 dated 25.10.47

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Letter to High Commissioner for Palestine, Jerusalem, dated 6th November 1947, with enclosures.	Disposal of personal effects of the late W. Silberstein

1	2	3	4	5	6
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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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57
Consular Section
BRITISH EMBASSY,
P r a g u e III.

31/4/2-47

6th November 1947

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 1441 of the 21st October about the disposal of the personal effects of the late Mr. Wolf Silberstein of Jaffa Road, Jerusalem, who died in Prague on the 10th October, 1947.

2. As instructed, the deceased's personal effects with the exception of certain valuables, were addressed to the Administrator General, Government of Palestine, and despatched with the coffin of the deceased to Jerusalem leaving Prague by special plane on the 26th October, 1947, and I attach a list of the items sent.

3. I now enclose the following personal effects, the remaining property of the late W. Silberstein.

1. Travellers cheques amounting to £75.--.
(3 cheques @ £10 and 9 cheques @ £5).

2. 40 Swiss francs (two banknotes @ Sw.Frs.20.--).

3. 136 USA Dollars (10 banknotes @ \$10, 7 banknotes @ \$5 and 1 banknote \$1.)

4. 15,000 Drachmas (2 notes @ 10,000 and 5,000)

5. 1 ring of yellow metal.

/6.

The High Commissioner for
Palestine,
Jerusalem.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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58

6. Receipt for Kcs. 4,845.-- signed by Mr. Sorer.
7. 2 gilt fountain-pens
8. 1 wrist-watch "Roleo" No. 387577 with strap.
9. Palestinian passport No. 234993 (cancelled).
10. Ten miscellaneous coins.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) PATRICK HEYNO

British Vice Consul.

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1	1	2			

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59

- 1 black wallet
- 1 grey suit
- 1 light-grey suit
- 1 dark-grey suit
- 1 water-proof raincoat
- 1 light pullover
- 1 pr. light short pants
- 1 undervest with sleeves
- 1 grey hat
- 1 pr. light-blue pyjamas
- 10 pairs of men's gloves - new
- 12 various ties
- 1 pair brown slippers
- 3 prs pants
- 3 undervests
- 2 shirts
- 6 handkerchiefs
- 6 prs socks
- 2 books
- 1 brown bag with various letters and imitation jewellery
- 4 shirts
- 1 pr. pants
- 4 handkerchiefs
- 2 new money-purses - empty
- 3 prs. spectacles and various toilet articles
- 1 black wallet - new
- 1 pen-knife
- 1 lighter
- 2 prs. shoes
- 1 pr. slippers - old.

FO 371 / 61794



75009/1046.

10525 / 46 / 31

The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with reference to the latter's communication E 10525/46/31 of the 12th November 1947 forwarding correspondence from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Prague has the honour to return the enclosures to the Foreign Office communication under reference and to state that the personal effects and remaining property of the late W. Silberstein received from Prague have been forwarded to the High Commissioner for Palestine for disposal.

Colonial Office,
The Church House,
Great Smith Street,
S.W.1

20 November, 1947.

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 154 1947 31 </div> <div> Palestine EASTERN </div> <div> E10536 /G 11 NOV 1947 61 </div> </div>	
E10536 /46/C New York 3292 Dated 10 Nov Received 11 Nov.	withdawal from Palestine
Last Paper. E1050Y References. E1050Y/46/C	(Minutes.) See E10546 JB, mv. 13
(Print.)	
(How disposed of.) Being copied	
<div style="display: flex;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> (Action completed.) 12-18 </div> <div style="flex: 1;"> (Index.) 6/11 </div> </div>	
Next Paper.	

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3270 D.12.25 a.m. 9th November, 1947.
8th November, 1947 R. 6.55 a.m. 9th November, 1947.
Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington

IMMEDIATE

LIGHT

TOP SECRET

Following for Secretary of State from Minister of State.

Whatever else may be said of the Assembly proceedings on Palestine so far, they abundantly confirm the wisdom of your decision that we should evacuate Palestine as soon as possible regardless of what the United Nations may recommend.

2. However, I think after full discussion here that a stage has been reached at which I should ask you for further directives and possibly for authority to add to the explanation of our policy already given to the Assembly.

3. The point on which we have so far insisted both in our public statements and in conversation with other delegates is that the Assembly should not recommend a paper solution based on the assumption that British troops will deal with whatever troubles arise from the attempt to implement it. We have indicated that the Assembly's recommendations will be incomplete in our view unless they include provisions for some kind of collective enforcement.

4. We are naturally being pressed on the extent to which we should be prepared to participate in such collective enforcement. A prior question which may well be put to us is whether we should regard the U.N.S.C.O.P. partition scheme or whatever variant of it may emerge from committee, as satisfying our two conditions for participation - namely inherent justice and the possibility of implementation without the use of excessive force. We should welcome any additional guidance you can now give us on these two questions.

5. It now seems clear to us here, however, that there is virtually no chance of any agreement being reached on a plan for collective enforcement, i.e. a plan providing for the formation of an international force to maintain law and order pending the establishment of whatever régime or régimes succeed the Mandatory Government. Thus the alternatives with which we are faced in practice reduce themselves to two.

(I) A recommendation providing for no (repeat no) non-British means of enforcing it; or

(II) No recommendation at all.

/6. In the

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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6. In the former case the recommendation might be made exclusively to the United Kingdom which would be left alone to accept or reject it. More probably some kind of United Nations commission would be nominated to supervise the process of transition in Palestine. It would be assumed that the British forces, so long as they remained in the country, would co-operate with the commission and on that assumption they would inevitably become involved in enforcement of the Assembly's recommendation.

7. As we see it here, the fact has to be faced that we cannot withdraw from Palestine without in some way influencing by the manner of our withdrawal the subsequent course of events in that country. If for example we withdraw by territorial stages, our choice of the areas to be evacuated first will materially affect both the prospects for partition and the probable frontiers of a Jewish State. Nor do I think (whatever our intention may be) that we could afford completely to disregard all the disturbances which may be expected to occur during our withdrawal, if they did not directly impede the process of withdrawal.

8. If my argument is sound, the choice with which we are now faced is between withdrawing in our own way (thereby influencing the future of Palestine but without being branded as the instrument of any United Nations decision) and withdrawing in the presence of a United Nations commission with which we should be expected to co-operate and with which I think we could not avoid co-operating to some extent. Not only the American but also the Soviet proposal, or any compromise which may be reached between them, would, if we accepted it, draw us into the position of the sole enforcing agency and so defeat what has been a major objective of our policy.

9. In these circumstances it seems essential to decide whether it would suit us better for the Assembly to make a recommendation or to fail to do so. If we would prefer not to have any recommendation of the kind that now seems likely, how far should we go in using our influence against any such scheme that might emerge? We might say that it is unrealistic to plan partition or any other scheme unless account is taken of the necessity to provide means of implementing it. We might then refer to the conditions laid down in our original statement and say that therefore we could have no part in enforcing the scheme. That should be sufficient to prevent its adoption. But in saying this we might add that if nevertheless the Assembly by a two-thirds majority approved any such solution we would not take any action contrary to it.

10. If on the other hand we are to continue along our present line of waiting for the Assembly to reach a conclusion without departing from our attitude of neutrality, I suggest that we should make a statement at a suitable opportunity indicating as clearly as possible the limitations upon the activities of our troops that we should contemplate. This would reduce the risks indicated in paragraph 7 above without however eliminating them altogether.

/11. The Commonwealth

65

- 3 -

11. The Commonwealth delegations are waiting for a further lead from us. Mr. [Name] as Chairman of the Palestine Committee and [Name] who is participating in the current talks on enforcement with the American and Soviet delegations, are in a good position to help us if we make our wishes clear to them. Whether or not you wish us to add in any way to our public statements, I hope we may be authorised to pass on at least to these two as much as possible of our present intentions.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram NO. 161.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition.]

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

<p>158 12/17</p> <p>E 10537/46/C</p> <p>New York 3293</p> <p>Dated 10 Nov Received 11 Nov</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Palestine</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EASTERN</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Proposal for termination of Palestine mandate & withdrawal of troops</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>E 10537 /G</p> <p>11 NOV 1947</p> </div>
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 30%;"> <p>Last Paper.</p> <p>(E 10536)</p> <p>References.</p> </div> <div style="width: 40%;"> <p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>See E 10546</p> <p style="text-align: right;">JB Mr. 13</p> </div> <div style="width: 30%;"></div> </div>		
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 30%;"> <p>(Print)</p> </div> <div style="width: 40%;"> <p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>Being 15 pages</p> </div> <div style="width: 30%;"></div> </div>		
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 30%;"> <p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>2F 13/11</p> </div> <div style="width: 40%;"> <p>Index</p> </div> <div style="width: 30%;"> <p>Next Paper.</p> </div> </div>		

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

E 50534
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Cypher/OTP

DIPLMATIC SECRET DISTRIBUTION

67

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3293

10th November, 1947.

D. 7. 09 p.m. 10th November, 1947.

R. 1. 15 a.m. 11th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE

LIGHT

My telegram No. 3292.

Following is text

[Begins]

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate on 1st May 1948 and the armed forces of the Mandatory Power shall be withdrawn from Palestine by that date.
2. Independent Arab and Jewish states shall come into existence in Palestine on 1st July 1948, or at such earlier date subsequent to 1st May 1948 as the United Nations Commission, referred to below, recommends and the Security Council approves as desirable and practicable.
3. There shall be a commission appointed by the General Assembly of 3 - 5 members representing small powers.
4. The functions of the commission shall be to implement the measures recommended by the General Assembly as follows:
(The provisions to be included here, after approval by the Working Group, will be drafted having in mind the recommendations of U.N.S.C.O.P. report, points 5-10 of the Soviet delegation's proposals of 3rd November and any other suggestions made by members of the Working Group).
5. The commission shall assist the Mandatory in the performance of its functions up to the termination of the Mandate.
6. The commission shall be responsible for the administration of Palestine in the period, if any, between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the two independent states.

/ 7. The Commission

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7. The Commission shall act under the authority and guidance of the Security Council. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such special instructions within the purview of the recommendations of the General Assembly as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue. The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

(Further clarification of the last two sentences of this paragraph may be made by the Working Group)

Note:

During the period between the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution on Palestine and the termination of the Mandate, the Mandatory Power shall be requested by the General Assembly to continue to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the conduct of essential public services in Palestine

[Ends]

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 169.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61794

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<div style="text-align: right;">69</div> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> <p>159</p> <p>E 10538/46/G</p> <p>New York</p> <p>3308</p> <p>Dated 10 Nov</p> <p>Received 11 Nov</p> </div> <div> <p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p> </div> <div> <p>E10538 /G</p> <p>11 NOV 1947</p> </div> </div>	
<p>U.S. - Soviet proposal for Palestine: Comments of U.K. Delegation.</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>(E10537) 77</p> <p>References.</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>3P8</p> <p>See E10546</p> <p>JB MW. 13</p>
<p>(Print.)</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p> <p>Being copied</p> <p>for New York 3875</p> <p>12 Nov</p> <p>Rpt'd to 'on 11/11</p> <p>Terrusalem.</p> <p>for 'on 11/12</p> <p>12 Nov</p> <p>Rpt'd New York 3876</p> <p>P.T.O.</p> <p>of / Guy Carpenter</p> <p>Mr. Duffell Smith</p>	
<p>(Action completed.)</p> <p>25 11</p>	<p>(Index.)</p> <p>WJH</p>
<p>Next Paper.</p>	

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

70

af/c Stapleton
H. J. J.
Mr. Traffot Smith
C.D.
from Mr. Bubbins
H. J. J.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Jim O'Hare.

Minutes.

71

At a talk in the House of Commons this afternoon between the S.O.S., the Colonial Secretary & Mr Alexander it was agreed that a further tel. should be sent to New York, & backed up by one to Washington, commenting on the American - Soviet proposals in N.Y. Tel.

No 3293. I attach a draft, in which I have also incorporated the gist of the draft, which you have already seen, of the reply to N.Y. Tel. 3270.

The attached draft will have to go to the Colonial Sec. & Minister of Defence before it goes to the S.O.S. If you agree I will send it

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72

Minutes.

it first thing to-morrow.

BAR Innow

11.11

JP Nov 11

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61794

5. Presumably you would wish us to include in any statement we may make of our willingness to consider this proposal, a categorical assertion that we could not agree to share our mandatory responsibility with the commission adding that our responsibility would apply only to the areas of which we remained in effective occupation. No doubt you would also wish us to comment upon the practicability of completing our withdrawal by the 1st May. Can we yet say anything on the date for beginning it?

6. It seems here to be highly desirable that we should be in a position to comment on this latest proposal as soon as possible, and we therefore hope for early instructions.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 171.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Registry

No. E10523/44/3

Top Secret.
SECRET.
CONFIDENTIAL.
RESTRICTED.
SECRET.

CYPHER

75

November, 1947.

Despatched 10.50 M.

Draft.

B. A. B. B. / UKSEL.
New York.

MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

Telegram.

No. 3875

(Date) 11/11

Repeat to:—

Washington, (min.)
Jerusalem.

Ex-Officio.

Code.

Cypher.

Distribution:—

Diplomatic Secret.

Copies to:—

C.O.
My Defence
Mr. Lube
(Lab. Office)

Your telegrams Nos. 3270 and 3308 of November 8th and 10th: Palestine.

Following for Minister of State and Sir A. Cadogan from Foreign Secretary.

American-Soviet plan does not alter our fundamental position set out in my telegram No. 3852 of November 11th, but it makes it all the more necessary to emphasise certain points of our position, particularly to American and Dominion representatives and, at your discretion, at appropriate moments in Committee discussions.

2. Our basic position is that we will not allow British administration or troops to be used directly or indirectly by the U.N. in enforcing a settlement, which is going to provoke serious opposition in Palestine or in neighbouring countries. This means that if

a U.N. commission is in Palestine taking preparatory steps for an enforced settlement, British administration and troops would not continue to exercise administrative responsibility or to keep law and order except for their own protection in the process of withdrawal. The conditions on which failing an agreed settlement we would be prepared to continue administrative responsibility until a date near to that on which our troops could

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Reference.

FO 371 / 61794

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be withdrawn are stated at the end of paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 3852. Our willingness to do that would however be affected if the United Nations decided to send a Commission to Palestine to enforce a settlement. In those circumstances we should not be prepared to continue administrative responsibility unless there were a truce to be observed by all parties pending the arrival of the Commission, whereupon or very shortly indeed thereafter we would relinquish administrative responsibility. We do not therefore necessarily agree with 2 (b) in your telegram No. 3308. Circumstances may arise in which we should wish to liquidate our responsibilities over large parts of the country at a very early date. In other words, if U.N.C. wish to send a Commission to enforce a settlement to which both parties did not agree, we should have to insist that it should not arrive in Palestine until after, or until very shortly before, we relinquished administrative responsibility; or, if they insisted on sending a Commission at once, we should have to relinquish our administrative responsibility at once also.

3. I realise that this sort of attitude may seem unconstructive and leads on to the question asked in your telegram No. 3270 whether we would prefer that the Assembly agreed on no recommendations.

4. It seems most difficult for us to take any active part in steering the Assembly towards acceptable recommendations. The difficulty is that if we start talking about the substance of proposals, we shall surely be driven step by step

to/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61794

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3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46. (51) F.&S.

energies.

5. I do not ^{feel} ~~wish~~ ^{that} however ^{I should like} ~~at present to commit~~ ^{accept} myself to your assumption that we must exclude all possibility of a recommendation providing for non-British enforcement; but if this assumption were ^{correct} ~~credited~~ and we were faced with a choice between recommendations involving enforcement of law and order by British arms and no recommendation at all, ^{the latter} ~~it~~ is obviously preferable. Even if there were no recommendation at all, ~~we~~ should, as you say in your telegram No. 3270, inevitably influence the final solution by our manner of withdrawing, but this would give us far more latitude and would be far less likely to lay us open to damaging suspicions. It would be better to withdraw in our own way thus possibly influencing the de facto settlement rather than to tie ourselves to a principle and publicly put a solution on these lines forward for everyone to shoot at. The above is for your highly confidential information and should not on any account be used for public ^{statement} ~~settlement~~ or discussion with other delegations. We must be extremely careful not to give the impression that it would suit us if the Assembly should fail to make any recommendations, though I agree that we could go as far as paragraph 9

of/

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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Reference: **FO**371 / 61794

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Top Secret.

CYPHER/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3,875.

12th November, 1947.

D: 10.33 p.m. 12th November, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington No. 11711 (Immediate),
Jerusalem.

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Your telegrams Nos. 3,270 and 3,308 [of November 8th and 10th: Palestine].

Following for Minister of State and Sir A. Cadogan from Foreign Secretary.

American-Soviet plan does not alter our fundamental position set out in my telegram No. 3,852 [of November 11th], but it makes it all the more necessary to emphasise certain points of our position, particularly to American and Dominion representatives and, at your discretion, at appropriate moments in Committee discussions.

2. Our basic position is that we will not allow British administration or troops to be used directly or indirectly by the United Nations in enforcing a settlement, which is going to provoke serious opposition in Palestine or in neighbouring countries. This means that if a United Nations commission is in Palestine taking preparatory steps for an enforced settlement, British administration and troops would not continue to exercise administrative responsibility or to keep law and order except for their own protection in the process of withdrawal. The conditions on which failing an agreed settlement we would be prepared to continue administrative responsibility until a date near to that on which our troops could be withdrawn are stated at the end of paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 3,852. Our willingness to do that would however be affected if the United Nations decided to send a Commission to Palestine to enforce a settlement. In those circumstances we should not be prepared to continue administrative responsibility unless there were a truce to be observed by all parties pending the arrival of the Commission, whereupon or very shortly indeed thereafter we would relinquish administrative responsibility. We do not therefore necessarily agree with 2 (b) in your telegram No. 3,308. Circumstances may arise in which we should wish to liquidate our responsibilities over large parts of the country at a very early date. In other words, if United

/Nations

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61794**

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3. I realise that this sort of attitude may seem unconstructive and leads on to the question asked in your telegram No. 3,270 whether we would prefer that the Assembly agreed on no recommendations.

5. I do not feel however that at present I can accept your assumption that we must exclude all possibility of a recommendation providing for non-British enforcement; but if this assumption were correct and we were faced with a choice between recommendations involving enforcement of law and order by British arms and no recommendation at all, the latter is obviously preferable. Even if there were no recommendation at all, we should, as you say in your telegram No. 3,270, inevitably influence the final solution by our manner of withdrawing, but this would give us far more latitude and would be far less likely to lay us open to damaging suspicions. It would be better to withdraw in our own way thus possibly influencing the de facto settlement rather than to tie ourselves to a principle and publicly put a solution on these lines forward for everyone to shoot at. The above is for your highly confidential information and should not on any account be used for public statement or discussion with other delegations. We must be extremely careful not to give the impression that it would suit us if the Assembly should fail to make any recommendations, though I agree that we could go as far as paragraph 9 of your telegram No. 3,270.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61794

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Registry
No. *E 3875/46/8*

CYPHER
November, 1947.
TOP SECRET

Draft.

WASHINGTON.

Telegram.

No. *11712*
Date. *12 Nov*

Repeat to
UKDEL
NEW YORK. *3875*
IMMEDIATE

Cypher

Diplomatic Secret.

*Copy C.O.
My 87 J. J. J.
Mr Luke
(Lab. Office)*

Despatched

9 30 P. M.

My telegram No. *3875* to New York.

Please make absolutely clear to Mr.

Marshall, our reaction to the American-Soviet proposal. It is surely playing the Russian game to try to embroil our troops in repressive action in Palestine either against Jews or Arabs and we for our part will not stand for it. However much we might say we were acting as agents of U.N.O., the reaction would inevitably be directed only at us. *And* we will not play the role of providing what is *virtually* a mercenary army to be used to shoot either side in the name of law and order but which, in fact, is enforcing a settlement by force on one side or the other. Neither will we put *other* soldiers under the command *of* either *a* United Nations Commission or of a foreign power. They must remain under our own control *and* *commissioned*. I cannot imagine that the U.S. Government would in any circumstances do otherwise with their own forces.

SP

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC(SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No.11712

12th November, 1947. D. 9.30 p.m. 12th November, 1947.

Repeated to New York (UKDEL) No.3876 IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET

My telegram No.3875 to New York.

Please make absolutely clear to Mr. Marshall our reaction to the American-Soviet proposal. It is surely playing the Russian game to try to embroil our troops in repressive action in Palestine either against Jews or Arabs and we for our part will not stand for it. However much we might say we were acting as agents of United Nations, the reaction would inevitably be directed only at us. We will not play the role of providing what is virtually a mercenary army to be used to shoot either side in the name of law and order but which, in fact, is enforcing a settlement by force on one side or the other. Neither will we put our soldiers under the command either of a United Nations Commission or of a foreign power. They must remain under our own control and command. I cannot imagine that the United States Government would in any circumstances do otherwise with their own forces.

QQQ

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E

With the Compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for the Commonwealth
Palace
Any telegraphic retransmission of this secret cypher (publex)
telegram must be prepared in a one-time system.

put with
15 NOV 1947

83

OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM DOMINIONS OFFICE

F.2781/43
CYPHER (PUBLEX)

E10532/ C.D.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 7.00 p.m. 14th Nov., 1947.)

IMMEDIATE

D. No. 881 TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET

My telegram 12th November D. No. 877.

PALESTINE.

Following personal for Prime Minister for his most confidential information. Begins.

The various proposals which have been made in committee for solution of Palestine problem, culminating in United States - Soviet proposals of 10th November have inevitably caused us to review our attitude to whole question, but we have not (repeat not) been able to see any valid reasons for changing basic lines of our policy as given by Colonial Secretary in his opening speech at Assembly (my telegram 20th September D. No. 778).

2. You will recall that in spite of efforts made by Mr. Bevin in 1945 and subsequently by Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry it proved impossible for us to devise a settlement which would have support of both Jews and Arabs. Accordingly we referred question to Assembly and throughout discussion there we have resolutely refused to pass judgment on solutions which have been suggested. If we did so, we should be drawn into sponsoring some particular proposal and would become once again target for criticism similar to that we have suffered in the past. It is precisely because it is our own troops and administration who are in Palestine at present, and because compromises that we have suggested have been rejected in the past, that we have to be so careful not (repeat not) to get embroiled in substance of any settlement Assembly may propose.

SPECIAL

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- 2 -

3. We realise that should Assembly fail to reach agreed solution, manner in which our withdrawal was conducted (for example choice of areas from which we withdraw) would inevitably influence final solution and it might well be that we should be subjected to criticism on that score. But for reason given above, although results in practice might well be very similar, we consider that production of de facto settlement in this way is preferable to publicly committing ourselves to support some definite proposal.

4. It is therefore no (repeat no) unco-operative spirit which forces us to take a somewhat negative attitude in discussion. All we can do is to leave Assembly in no (repeat no) doubt about our attitude towards employment of our troops and Administration in helping to implement decisions they may reach, so that Assembly does not (repeat not) attempt to pass recommendations which would involve our participation in enforcement of settlement on terms which we are not (repeat not) prepared to contemplate.

5. Practical results which follow at the moment from decisions taken in my telegram under reference and from considerations mentioned above are as follows:-

Our basic position is that, we will not (repeat not) allow our Administration or troops to be used directly or indirectly by United Nations in enforcing a settlement, which is going to provoke serious opposition in Palestine or in neighbouring countries. This means that if a United Nations Commission is in Palestine taking preparatory steps towards imposition of such a settlement, our administration and troops would not (repeat not) continue to exercise administrative responsibility or to keep law and order except for their own protection in process of withdrawal. We should be prepared to continue administrative responsibility, failing an agreed settlement, only if there were to be a truce observed by all parties pending arrival of United Nations Commission and on understanding that, on Commission's arrival or very shortly indeed thereafter, we should relinquish administrative responsibility. In other words, if United Nations wish to send a commission/

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commission to enforce a settlement to which both parties did not (repeat not) agree, we should have to insist that it should not (repeat not) arrive in Palestine until after, or until very shortly before, we relinquished administrative responsibility or, if they insisted on sending a commission at once, we should have to relinquish our administrative responsibility at once also.

6. In committee discussions Sir A. Cadogan has been authorised at his discretion to make clear our views as outlined in my preceding paragraph and to emphasise that planning of partition or final scheme is unrealistic unless account is also taken of necessity for providing means for its implementation. Further definition of conditions originally laid down by us should leave committee in no (repeat no) doubt as to how far we are prepared to go in enforcing any given solution. Most we can say is that we would not (repeat not) take any action contrary to any scheme which Assembly approved by two-thirds majority. Ends.

Copy to:- Prime Minister's Private Secretary
 Foreign Office P.S. to Secretary of State
 Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick
 Mr. B.A.B. Burrows
 Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)
 Colonial Office P.S. to Secretary of State
 Mr. Trafford Smith
 M/Defence Lt. Col. Parry (for C.O.S.)

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.,

12th November, 1947.

E10538/46/9

TOP SECRET

Broffitt
notelq838

As a result of the discussion in the Foreign Secretary's room in the House of Commons yesterday between the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Colonial Secretary, it was agreed that telegrams should be sent to New York and Washington giving our views on the American-Soviet plan for Palestine, in amplification of the telegram just sent to New York as No. 3852, giving the conclusions of the Defence Committee meeting last week.

I now enclose drafts of the telegrams which we would propose to send, subject to the concurrence of the Minister of Defence and Colonial Secretary. The drafts have been approved at the highest official level in the Foreign Office and will be submitted to the Foreign Secretary as soon as we have the concurrence of the other two Ministers concerned. I should be most grateful if you could let me know as soon as possible, preferably by telephone, whether the Minister of Defence concurs. We are under considerable pressure from New York to give them our views and we would hope to be able to submit the telegrams to the Foreign Secretary to-day.

Colonial
Secretary/

Group-Capt. Stapleton,
Cabinet Offices.

Trafford Smith, Esq.,
Colonial Office.

I/

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FO 371 / 61794

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I enclose, for convenience of reference, copies of the New York telegrams immediately concerned and of our telegram No. 3852.

I am sending a similar letter to Trafford
Stapleton
Smith at the Colonial Office.
at the Cabinet Offices.

(Signed) B. A. B. BURROWS.

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References:

FO 371 61794

Trarford Station, N.Y.
Colonial Office.

<p>1947</p> <p>160 31</p>	<p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<p>E10541 /G</p> <p>11 NOV 1947</p>
<p>E10541/46/C</p> <p>Sir T. Lloyd</p> <p>C.O.</p> <p>to Sir O. Sargent</p> <p>Dated 7 Nov</p> <p>Received 11 Nov.</p>	<p>Palestine: Instructions for 88</p> <p>U.K. Delegation</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p> <p>E10538</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p>	
<p>References</p> <p>E10242/46/C</p> <p>E10231/95/31.</p>	<p>h. P. Sargent</p> <p>Nov. 12</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>2/5 Sir T. Lloyd</p> <p>C.O.</p> <p>from Sir O. Sargent</p> <p>8 Nov</p>		
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>2/13/11</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>h.p.</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>		

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11 NOV 1947



Personal

E
E10541
COLONIAL OFFICE,

CHURCH HOUSE,

11 NOV 1947
GREAT SMITH STREET, S.W.1.

89
7th November 1947

Dear Sargent,

I have just seen a copy of your message
to Cadogan sent on the 3rd of November in
Fo. telegram No 3761 to New York.

I realise that the Fo. have the direct responsibility
for the U.K. delegation to the United Nations and
must therefore reserve the right to criticise its
handling of business. But in this particular
matter of Palestine, as which our Departments have
throughout worked so closely together, I should have
hoped that we should be consulted before
Martin was thus rebuked. If your message is
passed on to him he is likely, I feel, to
take it badly particularly as, according to
para 2 of New York telegram No 376 of the 2nd of November,

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
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his reply to the U.S. delegate was largely based on
notes drafted by my S. & S. shortly before he left.

Yours sincerely,

T. K. / *[Signature]*



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Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft. B. A. B. B.
Sir T. Lloyd,
Colonial Office.

(From Sir Orme
Sargent)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(13555) Wt. 43698-114 200m 2/47 G.S.St. Gp. 620

91
November, 1947.

PERSONAL

Thank you for your personal letter
of November 7th about our telegram No.
3761 to New York.

I should explain that this telegram
was sent as an immediate response to
paragraph 4 of New York telegram No. 3168,
which seemed to require us to take sides as
between the two inconsistent statements
which had been made in the two different
committees. We thought it best to send
something off on this point immediately
while the more full statement of our
attitude subsequently sent off with your
concurrence in our telegram No. 3780 of
November 5th was being prepared and
submitted.

The last thing I wished to do was
to make any personal reflections on
Martin's handling of the debate and, if I
have/

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

92.

have appeared to do so, I should sincerely regret it. But I was and still am clearly of the opinion that the first objective of our representatives in the committees should be to limit with the greatest possible precision the responsibility of H.M.G., even at the expense of appearing for the present to take up a rather negative attitude.

I will certainly see that no further telegrams of this kind are sent to New York without your concurrence.

[Seen by Sir C. Sargent]

ANS

2.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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enter E/4
93.

November 8th, 1947.

PERSONAL.

Dear Lloyd.

Thank you for your personal letter of November 7th about our telegram No. 3761 to New York.

I should explain that this telegram was sent as an immediate response to paragraph 4 of New York telegram No. 3168, which seemed to require us to take sides as between the two inconsistent statements which had been made in the two different committees. We thought it best to send something off on this point immediately, while the more full statement of our attitude subsequently sent off, with your concurrence, in our telegram No. 3780 of November 5th was being prepared and submitted.

The last thing that I wished to do was to make any personal reflections on Martin's handling of the debate, and if I have appeared to do so, I should sincerely regret it. But I was and still am clearly of the opinion that the first objective of our representatives in the committees should be to limit with the greatest possible precision the responsibility of His Majesty's Government, even at the expense of appearing, for the present, to take up a rather negative attitude.

I will certainly see that no further telegrams of this kind are sent to New York without your concurrence.

Sir Thomas Lloyd, K.C.M.G.,
Colonial Office.

(sgd. O. G. Sargent)

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3176

D. 8.17 p.m. 2nd November 1947

R. 2.51 a.m. 3rd November 1947

2nd November 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Following for Lloyd, Colonial Office from Martin.

Position in Palestine Committee will be further considered by United Kingdom Delegation after statement from Soviet Representative expected tomorrow and in the light of message from Foreign Secretary in Foreign Office telegram No. 3737. Meanwhile you may find it useful to have my own purely personal comments on the situation as I see it today. There was little opportunity for discussion with Secretary of State after Herschel Johnson's statement on 31st October and I cannot quote his authority for the views expressed in this telegram; but his parting advice was that we should continue to maintain the position we had already stated.

2. My reply to Johnson (largely based on notes drafted by Secretary of State who was present during latter's statement) made it clear that the United Kingdom position remained as described in Mr. Creech Jones' statements on 26th September and 16th October. The reply did not however indicate any particular application of these statements to the United States proposal and did not reject the latter out of hand, although underlining the heavy responsibilities which it would impose upon the Mandatory Government.

3. It is necessary to consider what further clarification of the position of His Majesty's Government, if any, is necessary at this stage. If nothing is added to the immediate reply given on 31st October, some delegates will continue to complain of a sense of unreality in proceeding with discussion of plans based on the hypothesis of United Kingdom assistance which in the end may not be forthcoming. In general however there will probably be a disposition to follow the United States Delegate's advice (paragraph 10 of my No. 3165) to "go ahead and formulate a plan" looking for the cooperation of the United Kingdom later on.

4. It seems clear that we could not undertake without qualification to accept the responsibilities suggested for us by the United States proposal. On any reasonable estimate of Arab reactions to an enforced partition (and at this stage there is no prospect of an agreed partition) the Palestine Government would be faced with a problem of maintaining law and order throughout Palestine beyond its unaided resources, / particularly....

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2.

particularly when the latter were being progressively weakened in the process of withdrawal. Even if withdrawal were made by geographical stages and the responsibility were accepted only in respect of the progressively contracting fraction of the country over which control was maintained, the fact that we were supporting the introduction of partition would expose us to Arab violence and thus greatly increase and complicate the difficulties of withdrawal. As judged here (and of course subject to the views of the military authorities), even such a limited acceptance of responsibility would involve a heavy military commitment.

5. Ought we then to inform the Sub-Committee at once and categorically that there is no (repeat no) prospect of our acceptance of the United States proposal and that they had better look for some other solution? If we do so

(a) we shall be in the position of opposing the United States Government and may affront American public opinion and

(b) the Committee will be driven to consider proposals for an international force. The latter will raise all sorts of difficulties with the Russians and may well ultimately result in embarrassment for ourselves. It is perhaps because they themselves want to escape such embarrassment that the United States Government have now abandoned their original proposal and they would not welcome being forced back on to it. Even if agreement could be reached on the formation of a force to the composition on which we saw no objection, the duty of handing over to it in Palestine would greatly complicate and delay our own withdrawal.

6. It may be better to let the Committee discussion proceed on the basis of the United States proposal in the expectation that a two-thirds majority will ultimately not be forthcoming in General Assembly. In that event we could not fairly be criticised if we then announced that the plan, which would thus lack the authority of United Nations endorsement, is not one which we felt able to carry out. If after all there should be a two-thirds majority and we then are in the position of having to decline to follow the United Nations advice (for which we asked), we shall at least have the

/logical....

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logical defence that we could not declare our position till we saw the plan in its final form and knew the reaction of Arabs and Jews, since on the character of the plan as a whole (including such features as boundaries proposed and immigration arrangements) and the reaction to it, depends the nature of the burden we should be undertaking in accepting the roll involved.

7. We should in either case then proceed with withdrawal but if this were arranged in stages geographically, so that non-contiguous Jewish and Arab areas were the first to be released from our control, a partition would in effect emerge without His Majesty's Government incurring odium in the Arab world from enforcing a declared policy of this kind. At this stage of the withdrawal there might even be a possibility of Arabs and Jews coming to terms. On the other hand our withdrawal might be hampered by the reactions of disappointed Jewry.

8. In view of all the above considerations it seems best to stand on the short statement I made on 31st October and avoid any further explanation of the position of His Majesty's Government.

9. Above are the points of my Sunday meditations which I have not yet been able to discuss with Cadogan. Position may of course be altered by Russian statement tomorrow. It would be most helpful at this stage to have the views of yourself or High Commissioner to whom telegram is being repeated

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to High Commissioner Jerusalem (Top Secret and Personal) as my telegram No.145.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for Mr. Lloyd and for repetition to Jerusalem]

ccc

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1947

PALESTINE

10547

44 NOV

Registry
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received
in Registry

E10547/46/31

Brigadier
(Capt)

R.A.F. V.

AN/GEN/48

29 Oct
11 Nov

Establishment of University in Jerusalem.
Enclosed copies of paper by Mr George
Horrani on the possible establishment
of a University in Jerusalem.

Last Paper.

10547

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

~~Mr. Horron~~
Nov.

Ref. Dr. P. E. Morgan
British Council Nov
from A. W. Morgan
(sent by L.C. Dept) Nov. 27
Long. Horron's CO
Dec. 4

(Action
completed.)

(Index.)

G. E. Morgan
12/12

12/12/48

Next Paper.

E 10592

(Minutes.)

Copy CO. (Mr Mathieson)

ME 8
13/4

Cultural Relms. Dept. } first

D.S. Benit
Nov. 12

Cultural Relations Dept may care to
ask the C.O. what official plans, if any,
there are for the establishment of an
Arab University in Jerusalem. Would the
British Council be interested?

E. Watkinson
12/11

Miss Watkinson has agreed that I may send
a copy to Dr. Morgan, British Council (if ^{Eastern} Dept.
has no objection) who is shortly going to
Baghdad to discuss the foundation of a
university there.

As far as Palestine is concerned, in view of
the uncertain future of the country, I should say
that Dr. Horron's memorandum is not of
practical value at the moment.

Mr. W. A. G.

32003

F.O.P.

Mr. W. A. G.
24/11

D.S. Benit

Nov. 24

P.T.O.

20/11

24/11

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G. P. P. A. P. Morgan, (British Council) 4/12.

13 Dec '2

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References:


FO 371 61794

Ek E sam

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,
10 SHARIA TOLUMBAT,
CAIRO.

29th October, 1947. *99*

AA/GEN/48.



Dear Greenhill,

I enclose with this two copies of a thoughtful paper written by Mr. George Hourani (brother of Albert Haurani) on the possible establishment of a University in Jerusalem.

While the prospects of obtaining any financial assistance from H.M.G. are obviously tenuous, the paper may be of interest.

*Yours sincerely
H. Clayton*

D. Greenhill, Esq.,
M.E. Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

(Signed) H.N. Clayton.

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A SKETCH OF AN ARAB UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM.

1. Activities.

The first question that has to be asked is: What needs of the Arab world would a university in Jerusalem supply? Obviously it would provide a centre of higher studies for the Arabs of Palestine and Transjordan, and thus crown the educational structure of this country. This answer is true, but it may take us too far and not far enough. It will take us too far if it leads to an attempt to create a university complete in all its branches. There is no need to duplicate what exists in satisfactory form elsewhere within the range of Palestinians, in branches where such duplication would be expensive. It would be inadvisable to emulate the Schools of Medicine of Beirut or Cairo, or to establish a School of Engineering in the Holy City. On the other hand we must look further than the needs of Palestinian Arabs. We must ask what gaps exist in the intellectual and educational life of the Arabs and other Near Eastern peoples as a whole. Such gaps must be filled, even at great expense.

Bearing in mind, then, the needs of the local population and of the wider region, I shall try to describe the functions which our university should perform.

a. Research: A university is essentially a body of people seeking the truth. It can function without teaching but not without research. Research is not only valuable in itself, but is the source from which good teaching is constantly replenished, and the magnet which attracts advanced students. Thus it should be prominent in the work of the university from the start, and should be provided for generously in the budget. Some of the staff should be free to devote most of their time to it, and all should spend some time on it. A few research students would provide a link between staff and undergraduates.

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The most important task of research in our circumstances is to make a deep study of the social problems of the Near East: philosophical, religious, moral, political, economic, demographic, educational, domestic, agricultural, industrial, geographical, military, national, international, artistic. No doubt a number of factual surveys must be made, but the temptation to rest content with collecting facts must be resisted. By hard thought solutions must be found to many pressing problems.

Scientific research would require much expensive equipment, and should be limited to the minimum necessary for good science teaching. The emphasis should be on subjects of practical value, such as the properties of agricultural and mineral products of the country.

But both in human studies and in natural sciences it would be a mistake to exclude altogether problems of world interest, whenever adequate brains and equipment are available. Concentration on regional problems alone would have a narrowing effect.

b. Undergraduate education: This should be confined, at any rate in the first decade, to the three faculties of Arts, Sciences, and Social Studies. However great the need for technical training among the Arabs, Jerusalem is on the whole not the place for it. It is much better in the long run to turn out undergraduates of really sound general education who can then go to training and technical colleges, or conversely to take in older students who have previously had technical training or experience. Technical colleges in Haifa and other parts of Palestine might be affiliated with the university; if ever political conditions allow, certain technical subjects might be studied jointly with the Hebrew University in common institutes through the medium of English. But I shall not pursue the subject of technical education any further.

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3.

Faculties of the university:

Faculty of Arts: Departments of Graeco-Roman Studies, Semitic Studies, Romance languages and literature, Philosophy and religion, European history, Germanic languages (English and German), Slavonic languages (principally Russian), Fine Arts. A Department of Far Eastern Studies would be desirable later on, as such studies are wholly neglected in the Near East.

Faculty of Science: Departments of Mathematics,
Statistics, Physics and Chemistry, Biology.

Faculty of Social Studies: Departments of Geography, Economics, Education, Psychology, Law (general not professional), Politics. The distinction between the Faculties of Arts and of Social Studies is to some extent arbitrary. Philosophy and history, for example, have a very close relation with social studies.

It would be many years before all these Departments could be provided and staffed. Social Studies should be given priority, for the Near East is badly in need of suitably educated social workers, administrators, politicians, etc. Undergraduates taking their major studies in this Faculty would be ready to proceed to special training in the Social Workers' Training College (see below, c).

The university should also contain a Faculty of Agriculture, including Horticulture, Fishery and Forestry: but this would be mainly or entirely concerned with research, in co-operation with Government Departments and Research Stations. A few graduate students could do useful work, but undergraduates wishing to take a Bachelor's Degree in Agriculture would be better advised to go abroad.

A problem which I feel is not really solved by this programme of undergraduate teaching is that it maintains the sharp distinction between vocational and liberal education which has done so much harm in the West. Must a young man choose to become either a technical barbarian or an unwanted gentleman?

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4.

This problem requires a special study. In our case, since our university will be predominantly liberal, the problem presents itself in the form, How and when shall we give professional qualifications to our students? A partial answer is provided by the next section, c, for those who can afford to stay on after the B.A. or B.Sc.

c. Post-graduate Training Colleges: A Higher Teachers College mainly for the needs of Palestine schools; and a Social Workers College to train officials and welfare workers for all Arab countries.

d. Printing: A University Press, though requiring considerable initial outlay, would be economical in the long run, in view of the emphasis to be laid on research and therefore on writing. The aim should be a high standard of printing and binding, not easily obtained in commercial Arabic presses.

e. Possibly a Translation Bureau: but this can only be decided after consideration of what is being done in Egypt and elsewhere.

2. Accommodation.

a. The place of any university established in Palestine cannot be other than Jerusalem, if only because so many institutions of Learning and education are already established here. It is essential to have contact and co-operation with the Archaeological Museum and other scholarly institutes, the Government of Palestine, especially the Department of Education, the Y.M.C.A., British School of Higher Studies, Centre de culture française, the various Moslem and Christian religious bodies, the many schools, and eventually the Hebrew University. Jerusalem also enjoys a bracing climate, a central situation in the Arab world, and an appealing name which will draw money and interest from all over the world.

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5.

The site should be spacious enough to allow for future expansion, taking into account playing fields and gardens. The minimum of buildings for a university college would be two residential halls for men and women, a hall containing lecture-rooms, offices and studios for staff, a public lecture-hall or theatre, a library, a laboratory, and a printing press.

The university should certainly be residential for the majority of students. But it should be as different as possible from a secondary boarding school. To this end it should preferably not be near a secondary school nor grow out of one. Secondary methods and mentality would be hard to shake off.

Before plans are drawn up, consultations should be held with the institutions mentioned above, to see what facilities can be provided by them and so to avoid duplication. For example, it seems to me unnecessary to found an Oriental library on a large scale, when the Museum library, Ecole Biblique and other libraries are at hand.

3. Standards and syllabus.

Undergraduate studies must be maintained at a higher standard than at the existing universities of Cairo, Beirut and elsewhere. The aim should be to give Bachelors degrees equal to those of British universities.

How many years of post-Matriculation study are required before an Arab student can attain such a standard? It might be argued a priori that Palestine Matriculation is equal to London Matriculation, which qualifies for entrance to London University; that one year is required to the Intermediate; and two more to the General B.A. (or three more to an Honours B.A.) But this total of three (or four) years is in reality less than the minimum. The weakness occurs between Matric. and Intermediate, for our students should not attempt this in a single year. Experience in the Rashidiyah College shows that the weaker students cannot

pass at all, and the stronger ones receive no benefit from working for another public examination one year after Matric. The work is more cramming. With all its present handicaps the two years course at the Arab College is more wholesome. After Matric. the young man or woman enters a new phase of his intellectual life and needs time to settle down to it. These two years should prepare him to take full advantage of the following two or three years leading up to the B.A. General or Honours respectively.

This conclusion is confirmed by British experience. In Great Britain, although Matriculation is the official entrance qualification for a B.A. General, which takes three years at the university, the common practice is to remain at school for one, two or more years after matric. British schoolboys are in some ways ahead of Arabs: they are not faced with the same language difficulties, they have usually done more outside reading and out-of-class activities. According to the Asquith Report (Report of the commission on higher education in the colonies, 1945, Cmd. 6647), it is generally agreed in England that the standard which should be required of students when they begin their three-year B.A. course is that attainable in two years after School Certificate. (pp. 43-44).

Should these two preparatory years be done at school or university? At present they are being done under school conditions in 5th and 6th Secondary classes, and I think this is preferable, provided that school staffs deal suitably with boys and girls of this age (16-18 or 17-19). But if so, the examination at the end should be called and regarded as a Higher School Certificate rather than an Intermediate. (Incidentally this might prove more advantageous to students not proceeding to a university). University studies would then consist of a straight run of two years to B.A. General or three years to B.A. Honours. No Intermediate would be necessary. Fair arguments against an Intermediate are given in B. Truscot. "Red Brick University" pp. 139-40.

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4. Personnel.

Staff and students may be of either sex, and of any religion or nation provided they are able to pursue their studies in Arabic or whatever the language of instruction on their subjects may be. I have suggested above that this should be more than a Palestine university, and a large part of its

value would lie in the mingling of staff and students from all parts of the Near and Middle East, including, it is to be hoped, occasional Turks, Persians, Greeks, Indians, Ethiopians, etc.

Let us fix the minimum numbers required to start a university college at 30 staff (research and teaching) and 100 students. The proportion of staff to students is high, to allow research and the tutorial system. How are we to obtain a first-class staff? Partly by offering high salaries and attractive and secure conditions of work. (It is time someone organized a Combined Near East Universities Pension Scheme which would make transfers of staff easier). Partly by sending scholars to foreign universities to prepare for university teaching and research. This will take time, but it is necessary and may as well be started as soon as funds are available. How are we to obtain enough students of the required standard? At first this will be difficult, but it would be helpful to advertise the university college well throughout the Near and Middle East. In any case the staff can proceed with research if they are short of students. It is to be hoped that as secondary schools public and private up to 6th Secondary are extended in Palestine, a greater supply of well-prepared undergraduates will be forthcoming in a few years from now. The prospects of careers for graduates is another powerful factor in drawing students. Near Eastern Governments must be encouraged to recognize the value of well-educated graduates in a material way. An Arab welfare organization such as Mashru'al-Insha' must offer careers for the students of the Social Workers College. The university must have an Appointments Board to help graduates to find satisfactory employment in Palestine and beyond.

5. Constitution.

It is essential that a university should be autonomous.
its main object is the pursuit of truth and its members must be

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free to do this in the way they think best. To ensure this freedom, funds should not be drawn from any one source, but from several. No single "interest", governmental or other, should ever be allowed to dominate the counsels of the university. Staff and students must be completely free to speak their thoughts on any subject, whether in agreement with powerful organizations or not. On the other hand students must not be free to exercise any kind of pressure on the university or on the life of the nation, except the pressure of reason and orderly demonstration. These rights and duties should be written in the Charter of the university.

It is usual to have a Council, a Senate, a Chancellor and a Vice-Chancellor, and this constitution may be adopted. The Council has to supervise finance: the raising of funds and in a broad manner their expenditure. It has to maintain relations between the university and other institutions, especially those which contribute money or render other services. Thus it should be composed of experienced, enlightened and influential men of affairs, including representatives of the main contributors (suggested below, 6), of the university staff, of the public, etc. The Senate has to run the university: to decide on the main lines of growth in consultation with the Council, to appoint staff, confer degrees, and make all internal arrangements concerning study, residence, admission, etc. Thus it should consist of heads of Departments and other persons of academic standing, including representatives of London University and Fuad I. University if the suggestions of 3. above are adopted. The powers of the Senate should be well-defined in the Charter, to preserve them from encroachment by the Council.

Constitutional changes would be made only by joint meetings of Council and Senate, which should be of approximately equal numbers.

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The relation of the Palestine Board of Higher Studies to the university will have to be considered. It might eventually become redundant when there are both Arab and Hebrew universities with their own examining bodies.

Our scheme is costly. Fees paid by students can only cover a small portion of the cost. The rest must come from public and private grants. The initial cost of establishing a university such as has been described may be estimated very roughly at LP.1,000,000, the recurring annual cost at LP.100,000. Possible sources of income may be listed as follows:

- a. Fees.
- b. Private gifts. Palestine Arabs can probably be relied on to contribute generously.
- c. The Palestine Department of Education, especially for the Higher Teachers' College.
- d. The Palestine Departments of Social Welfare, Agriculture, etc., for special purposes.
- e. The Arab League.
- f. Arab Governments, especially Iraq, might make generous initial contributions towards founding a university, but could not be relied on to continue assistance.
- g. Mashru' al-Insha' should give something for sending scholars abroad.
- h. The U.S. Government and the Near East Foundation would almost certainly be interested in the Social Workers' College and might contribute on a very generous scale.
- i. The British Colonial Development Fund, depending on the future of Palestine. It would be wise to earmark

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contributions from this source as far as possible for research, as no other body is likely to appreciate the value of research to the same extent,

j. The British Council, for English studies.

k. The French Government, for French and Romance languages, as at the Hebrew University.

l. Would it be too much to hope that the Supreme Soviet might establish a Department of Slavonic Studies?

In order to draw funds from such varied sources, the Council of the University will have to be very tactfully composed, at least at the start.

It should be the aim to build up endowments.

7. The initial creation.

From whom should the first organized step come? From a suitable group of Palestinian Arabs. Other bodies likely to contribute, such as the Government of Palestine, the Arab League, should be represented; but they should not predominate or take the lead, as this would drive away other contributors, in the present state of political feeling. Only a body of independent and enlightened Arabs can draw support from all quarters.

Such a body must form a Preparatory committee which would be the germ of the first Council. Its first task must be to draw up a scheme for publication, which could be the basis for an appeal for funds. It must launch a vigorous appeal, but it must not wait till the full sum is collected before starting work. The university must be realizable in sections, with an order of priority. A modest target of funds must be reached before any land is bought or buildings erected.

In the order of priority, research work and foreign scholarships should stand high. These are essential as a solid foundation for a good teaching staff, and can be paid for almost immediately even before buildings are erected. The only danger

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is that such expenditure would not be appreciated by the public. Its value must be explained fully in written and oral statements, in order to maintain confidence.

But the real-bottle-neck is the supply of secondary *student of adequate standard. The increase of secondary* classes in Palestine depends largely on the supply of teachers for them. Thus higher secondary teachers are, as much as anything else, the key to university development. Scholars must be sent for this purpose in generous numbers to the United Kingdom, Egypt and other countries. This ^{is} a matter for the Department of Education and any Arab educational organization that is set up. It requires to be pursued immediately, because the minimum time for a student to remain at a university abroad is three years.

8. Conclusion.

The ideas contained in this sketch may be regarded as Utopian. That is all they can be. It would be foolish to put on paper suggestions for a site, or names of possible staff and administrators and private contributors. These practical details can only be dealt with by the Preparatory Committee, which must be chosen with great care from men and women of vision and understanding. Along with the practical task, it is necessary to keep in mind the aims; and this requires constant discussion and consultation, so that something worthy of Jerusalem may emerge

G. F. Hanani.

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A. E. Morgan

British Consul

W. W. MASON

Cop.

M. W. A. C.

Mathison

C.O.

OUT FILE

27/11/13

I enclose a copy of a memorandum by George Hourani, which Clayton has forwarded to us, on the possible establishment of a university in Jerusalem.

In view of the uncertain future of Palestine, I do not think the memorandum is of much practical value at present, but you may like to see it before you go to Baghdad. His scheme is not one that would be applicable to Baghdad in many ways but you will find several points of interest to you in it.

As we have only one space

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Spac copy of the memo.
would you please send
it on after perusal to
WAC Morrison at the
Colonial Office.

28/11

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. 115

27th November, 1947.

(E 10547/46/31)

I enclose a copy of a memorandum by George Hourani which Clayton has forwarded to us on the possible establishment of a University in Jerusalem.

In view of the uncertain future of Palestine, I do not think the memorandum is of much practical value at present, but you may like to see it before you go to Bagdad. His scheme is not one that would be applicable to Bagdad in many ways but you will find several points of interest to you in it.

As we have only one spare copy of the memorandum would you please send it on after perusal to W.A.C. Mathieson at the Colonial Office.

(R.W. Mason)

Dr. A.E. Morgan,
British Council.

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
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YOUR REFERENCE
COUNCIL REFERENCE

116 ?E, psc.
THE BRITISH COUNCIL
3 HANOVER STREET
LONDON W1

4th December, 1947.



INDEXED

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Dear Mason,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th November with which you enclosed the interesting Sketch of an Arab University of Jerusalem by George Hourani. As you know, I have felt that the scheme in general is right and I think that he has got hold of the right ideas in principle though I should be prepared to dispute some details.

I want my colleagues who are going to Baghdad to see this and as there seems to be only one copy I am venturing to have others made and in the course of a day or so I will send the original on to Mathieson as you ask.

Yours sincerely,

A. E. Morgan.

R.W. Mason, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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162 1947 31	Palestine EASTERN	E10592 /G 12 NOV 1947
E10592 /4619 COS(47) 132 nd MIA Min 4 Dated 27 Dec Received 12 Nov	Palestine: Supplications of withdrawal	
Last Paper E10592	(Minutes)	
References	See within 1. COS(47) 132 nd MIA Min 6 27 Dec. 2. COS(47) 136 th MIA Min 7 5 Nov. JB MV. 20	
(Print)	3. COS(47) 131st MIA Min 2. 4. Oct.	
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(Action completed) 27 Dec.	(Index) WJH.	
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4.

PALESTINE - IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(47)130th Meeting, Minute 2

THE COMMITTEE had before them a minute by the Secretary⁺ covering a revised draft cover note, prepared by the War Office, to the reports by the Joint Planning Staff and the Principal Administrative Officers Committee on the implications of the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine.

In discussion a number of amendments were suggested and accepted to the revised draft cover note.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Approved the revised draft cover note prepared by the War Office, as amended, and instructed the Secretary to submit copies to the Minister of Defence, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office.

+ COS. 1225/25/10/7

6.05(47) 132nd Mtg.

27 October, 1947

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6. PALESTINE - H.M.G.'s. DECLARATION TO WITHDRAW

THE SECRETARY was informed by telephone of the approval of the Chiefs of Staff to, and the concurrence of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office in, a draft telegram to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, attached to a Secretary's minute⁺, and it was therefore despatched.^x

100. 100. 30. x.
100. 100. 30. x.
100. 100. 30. x.

+ COS. 1098/30/9/7
* Sent as C.O.S.(ME)169

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

13. PALESTINE - IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL. *1/10* 121

8 NOV 1947

(Previous reference: COS(47) 130th Meeting, Minute 2)

The Chief's of Staff took note of a telegram from the
Commanders-in-Chief Middle East, giving their estimate of
forces required to implement either the majority or minority
report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

E105921

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6.05(47) 131st Mtg - 4 Oct. 1947.

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FO 371 / 61794

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Group.....10

Class 271

Piece 611924

Following document(s)*

~~retained in the Department of origin*~~

transferred to PRO Safe Room*

E10626/46/31



and closed until.....1998

***delete as necessary**

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

1947		Palestine	122 /G
104 31	EASTERN		
E10681/46/C		Palestine: Lydda airport.	
New York 3345			
Dated 13 Nov Received 14 Nov.			
Last Paper. E10626		(Minutes.) copy to C.O. (Mr. Mathison)	
References. E10633/951/31 in Sept.		 (J. E. CABLE) 14/11	
(Print.)		 23/11	
(How disposed of.) *) H. Mathison C.O. 24 Nov			
(Action completed.) 25/11	(Index.) 16/11		
Next Paper.			

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Reference:					
FO 371 / 61794					

Cypher/OTP

E10681
AIR MINISTRY

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

123

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3345 D. 2. 16 p.m. 13th November, 1947.
13th November, 1947. R. 7. 32 p.m. 13th November, 1947.

IMPORTANT

Please pass following to Air Ministry.

Air 82.

Top Secret.

Personal and exclusive for C.A.S. from Carrod.

1. Telegram No. 3336 dated 12th November 1947 from United Kingdom Delegation New York to Foreign Office, refers to the proposal made in Palestine Sub-Committee One that Lydda airport should be transferred from proposed Arab State to proposed Jewish State. Soviet delegate strongly supported this and United States Delegate spoke also in favour.

2. This, together with Soviet attitude on other matters mentioned in above telegram, seem to me to reinforce conclusion mentioned in our telegram MSC 40 of 6th November to Chiefs of Staff and in my letters to Dickson 715/4/RAF of 7th and 10th November that Russia is determined to establish communist regime in future Jewish state, thus undoing all our efforts in Greece and Turkey. In my view, this can only be prevented by suitable force of occupation in Palestine during transition period. T.O.O. 131300.

2 2 2

T.C.C. 131300

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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210633/951/31

124

EN CLAIR

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation)

No: 3336

D.9.25 p.m. 12th November 1947

12th November 1947

R.8.10 a.m. 13th November 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem

Washington Saving

GIANT

Palestine Sub-Committee One.

In the discussions on boundaries on Tuesday Lisicky put forward arguments against the proposals of the Working Group in so far as they separated Arab villages from their land and encroached upon road communications essential to the Arab State. To meet the former objection Shertok said that "The Jewish Delegation" was prepared to give an undertaking that land in the Jewish State belonging to villages in the Arab State would not be taxed at a higher rate than if it had been in the Arab State. The changes proposed by the Jewish Agency he said involved the division of only 27 villages but eliminated the cutting by the UNSCOP line of 15 other villages.

2. Other points of particular interest in the discussions were:

(a) Lydda airport. The United States delegate at first stated that the arguments put forward for its exclusion from the Arab State were insufficient to warrant the support of his delegation which wished to concur in a proposal made by Canada that the boundary should be so adjusted as to permit access to the airport from the Jewish State. When however the Soviet delegate had given strong support for the Jewish claim the United States delegate reversed his previous stand and expressed himself in favour of including the airport in the Jewish State, subject to special mention in the declaration of economic union which would guarantee to the Arabs access and use.

(b) Sarafand. The Jewish claim put forward on the grounds that the camp was required by the Jews both for military purposes and for the clearance of new immigrants, was firmly supported by the Soviet delegate.

(c) Shertok stated that the population figures used by the Jewish Agency in presenting their case were the official estimates of the Government of Palestine in respect of the Arab population and the Jewish Agency's own estimates in respect of the Jewish population. These were the only reliable estimates.

(d) In reply to a question from Canada the representative of the Jewish Agency said that the Palestine Potash Company was ready to agree to an equal division of royalties between the Jewish and Arab states irrespective of decisions on boundaries affecting the concession areas. Shertok hoped that the sub-committee would agree to the request of the company to include in the Jewish State the whole of the western shore of the Dead Sea and the northern works.

(e)

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(2)

(e) After a majority of members had expressed themselves against the Jewish Agency's proposal to include the village lands of Umm El Fahm and Arara in the Jewish State, the Chairman had summed up against this unimportant claim and Shertok had indicated in a final speech that he was reluctantly prepared to abandon it, the Soviet delegate who, except in regard to Sarafand and Lydda airport, had taken no other part in the five hour discussions, said that his delegation was in favour of the Jewish claim since they considered the area necessary to the Jewish State on economic grounds.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No:177.



[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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<div>1947</div> <div>16531</div> <div>E 10694/46/C</div> <div>W'ton 6409</div> <div>Dated 14 Nov Received 15 Nov</div>		<div>Palestine EASTERN</div> <div>E10694 /G 15 NOV 1947</div>
<div>Last Paper. E10538</div> <div>References. E10538/46/C</div> <div>(Print.)</div> <div>(How disposed of.) Tel W'ton 11996 20000 Rpd New York 4008</div> <div>(Action completed.) 25/11</div> <div>(Index.) W.H.</div> <div>Next Paper.</div>	<div>Sept (Minutes.)</div> <div>Copies to: C.O. (Mr. Mathison) W.O. (H.O. 4)</div> <div> (J. E. CABLE) 17/11</div> <div>Please see minute by Sir O. Sargent on the attached copy of this telegram. Mr Balfour's reply suggests that the matter is a very complicated one. as reported is open to the objection now stated by Sir O. Sargent. I submit a draft tel. in which C.O. concurs</div> <div>H.S. Beith Nov. 19 (BEITH)</div> <div></div> <div>28888 F.O.P. Tel. Ent: per attach 19/11 JB NW. 25</div>	

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<i>Reference:-</i> FO 371 / 61794									

127

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

26 FEB 1947

D. 6.47 p.m. 14th November, 1947

R. 1.00 a.m. 15th November, 1947

rk.

ador, I call:

and saying th

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Eastern Jeff.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel..

No. 6409

D. 6.47 p.m. 14th November, 1947

14th November, 1947

R. 1.00 a.m. 15th November, 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Your telegram No. 11712.

Palestine.

Following from Balfour.

In the absence of His Majesty's Ambassador, I called today on Mr. Marshall, who had been unable to receive me yesterday, and made the communication contained in your telegram under reference.

2. Mr. Marshall made no comment beyond saying that he had noticed from the morning's newspapers that at the end of his statement at New York yesterday, Sir Alexander Cadogan had spoken about administrative responsibilities which the British authorities would exercise in limited areas of which they would necessarily remain in occupation during the period of withdrawal. (N.B. Describing this part of the statement as "cryptic" the New York Times says that it has caused some observers to hope that the concept "limited areas" may be stretched "to include the major strategical points".) I explained to Mr. Marshall that this part of Sir Alexander Cadogan's statement meant that, if a United Nations' Commission were in Palestine taking preparatory steps for an enforced settlement, our authorities there would merely exercise administrative responsibility and keep law and order to the extent necessary for their own protection in the process of withdrawal.

k k k

Let Sec. of State know that we are not in a position to take any action at present. We are waiting for the Commission to be set up. We are not in a position to take any action at present. We are waiting for the Commission to be set up.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61794

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No. E10694/46/G

~~TOP SECRET~~
Secret.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~RESTRICTED~~
~~SECRET~~

Draft. Telegram
Washington.

Telegram.

No. 11996

(Date) NOV: 20

Repeat to:—

U.K. Delegation,
New York.
HQS 8.

Mr Mathieson
CO. Conners

J. S. Beir
Nov. 19

~~Ex-Clas.~~
~~Code~~
Cypher. 19.11

Distribution:—

World Organisation
Distribution.

Copies to:—

CYPHER

Important

19th November, 1947

Despatched

M.

SECRET
GIANT

Your Tel. No. 6409 of November
14th: Palestine last sentence.

There seems to be a certain contra-
diction between the conceptions of "keeping
law and order to the extent necessary for
withdrawal" and of "exercising administrative
responsibility". As far as we can foresee,
we shall only exercise limited administrative functions
in the areas which we continue to occupy after
the termination of our administrative responsibility for the
and these functions will be specifically whole country
directed to facilitating withdrawal. We
shall no longer be exercising governmental
responsibilities for administration.

2. I should be grateful if you and
Sir A. Cadogan will be guided by the above in
replying to any further enquiries on this
point.

Sin O Sargent.

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132

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

12th November, 1947.

D. 9.30 p.m. 12th November, 1947.

Repeated to New York (UKDEL) No. 3876 IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 3875 to New York.

Please make absolutely clear to Mr. Marshall our reaction to the American-Soviet proposal. It is surely playing the Russian game to try to embroil our troops in repressive action in Palestine either against Jews or Arabs and we for our part will not stand for it. However much we might say we were acting as agents of United Nations, the reaction would inevitably be directed only at us. We will not play the role of providing what is virtually a mercenary army to be used to shoot either side in the name of law and order but which, in fact, is enforcing a settlement by force on one side or the other. Neither will we put our soldiers under the command either of a United Nations Commission or of a foreign power. They must remain under our own control and command. I cannot imagine that the United States Government would in any circumstances do otherwise with their own forces.

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Reference:

F O 371 / 61794

<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 1947 166 31 E10735/46/C New York 3393 Dated 15 Nov Received 17 Nov </div> <div> Palestine EASTERN </div> <div> E10735 /G </div> </div>	
Palestine: Announcement in London 133	
Last Paper. E10694 References.	(Minutes.) Please see the attached Minute by Mr. Ridsdale. <p>I have consulted the Colonial Office about this telegram and they assure me that their News Department could not have been responsible for this report, since they were not informed in advance of the instructions being sent to Sir A. Cadogan. In view of the suggestion made in the second paragraph of Mr. Ridsdale's Minute I have also consulted Mr. Pumphrey of No. 10 and Mr. Fraser of the Cabinet Offices, to whom copies of this telegram have been sent. Mr. Pumphrey suggested that this was a matter which should be looked into in the first instance by the Cabinet Offices and Mr. Fraser is doing so. This will take some days and Mr. Fraser agrees that it would be desirable meanwhile to send an interim reply to Sir A. Cadogan. I submit a draft telegram.</p> <div style="text-align: right;"> J. G. S. Beith (J. G. S. Beith) 18th November, 1947. </div> <p>N.B. I understand that the Cabinet office are taking this up with their Security people. No doubt we should do the same</p> <p><u>Security Dept.</u></p> <div style="text-align: right;"> J. G. S. Beith 18.11 </div> <p>Seen by Mr Wright. Tel. sent.</p>
(Print.) (How disposed of.) Tel) V.K. Del. New York 3982. Rev. 18. Rptd. W/12 "84 S.W. 8/ Mr Fraser Cab. Offs. Mr Pumphrey re 40 Mr Matheson C.O. Rev 21.	
(Action completed.) 25/11/	(Index.) W/12
Next Paper. (7890146/C)	

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Reference: FO 371 / 61794

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Nations wish to send a Commission to enforce a settlement to which both parties did not agree, we should have to insist that it should not arrive in Palestine until after, or until very shortly before, we relinquished administrative responsibility; or, if they insisted on sending a Commission at once, we should have to relinquish our administrative responsibility at once also.

3. I realise that this sort of attitude may seem unconstructive and leads on to the question asked in your telegram No. 3,270 whether we would prefer that the Assembly agreed on no recommendations.

4. It seems most difficult for us to take any active part in steering the Assembly towards acceptable recommendations. The difficulty is that if we start talking about the substance of proposals, we shall surely be driven step by step to proposing a plan of our own. We could reply with something on the lines of the earlier "Bevin" or "Morrison" plans, but if we did so, we should then be back in exactly the position we have tried to avoid of sponsoring a proposal of our own, against which all concerned would no doubt immediately divert their energies.

5. I do not feel however that at present I can accept your assumption that we must exclude all possibility of a recommendation providing for non-British enforcement; but if this assumption were correct and we were faced with a choice between recommendations involving enforcement of law and order by British arms and no recommendation at all, the latter is obviously preferable. Even if there were no recommendation at all, we should, as you say in your telegram No. 3,270, inevitably influence the final solution by our manner of withdrawing, but this would give us far more latitude and would be far less likely to lay us open to damaging suspicions. It would be better to withdraw in our own way thus possibly influencing the de facto settlement rather than to tie ourselves to a principle and publicly put a solution on these lines forward for everyone to shoot at. The above is for your highly confidential information and should not on any account be used for public statement or discussion with other delegations. We must be extremely careful not to give the impression that it would suit us if the Assembly should fail to make any recommendations, though I agree that we could go as far as paragraph 9 of your telegram No. 3,270.

6. To sum up, we must make it clear, particularly to the Americans, that we cannot be used as the instrument of United Nations in imposing a settlement not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs or keeping order while a commission imposes it. If this results in the Assembly failing to agree on any recommendation, while that result would in some ways be regrettable, we feel that it is from our point of view preferable to a settlement which we should be expected, and must refuse, to enforce.

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D. 5.10 p.m. 15th November, 1947

R. 8.35 p.m. 15th November, 1947

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Reference:

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No. E10735/46/0

CYPHER

138

November 1947

Despatched 8 15 M.

Draft.

XXXXXX
Top Secret.
Secret
Confidential.
Restricted.
Excluded.

CONFIDENTIAL
IMPORTANT.

U.K. Delegation,
Telegram. New York.

No. 3982
(Date) Nov. 18

Repeat to :-

Washington
No. 1184 Saving.

B.H. Brown
18.11

Enx Clair.
Code
Cypher.

Distribution :-
Departmental No. 1.

Copies to :-

Mr. Fraser,
Cabinet Offices.
Mr. Pumphrey, No. 10
Mr. Matthieson, C.O.

Your telegram No. 3393 of November 15th: Palestine. *Following from Sir Aladen Full. for Cadogan from tangent.*
~~It is indeed regrettable that this newspaper report should have appeared at the same time as you made your statement. News Department have been warned that the instructions addressed to you gave you discretion in regard to the timing and contents of your statement and were consequently most guarded in answering enquiries. A.P. story did not emanate from News Dept.~~
2. The matter is being further investigated.

MTL

18.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Confidential.

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3982.

November 18th, 1947. D. 8.15.p.m. November 18th, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 1184 Saving.

IMPORTANT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your telegram No. 3393 [of November 15th:
Palestine].

Following for Sir A. Cadogan.

A.P. story did not emanate from News
Department.

2. The matter is being further investigated.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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FO 371/61794

W. K. W. W. W.

16th November, 1947.

<p>1547 167</p>	<p>Palestine EASTERN</p>	<p>E10436 /G 27 NOV 1947</p>
<p>E10436 /46/C Cabinet Conclusions (NY) 86th Item 2 November 11th</p>	<p>Withdrawal of British Forces from Palestine</p>	
<p>Last Paper E10435</p>	<p>(Minutes) 10. Nov. 18</p>	
<p>References</p>		
<p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of) off) Cairo no: 2110. Bagdad. no 1012 Jeddah no 466. Amman no 498 Beirut no 705 Ramas no 578 Rtd. Rev H. D.M.G.O. Cairo U.K. Del New York P.T.O. 39/6</p>		
<p>(Action completed) 2F19/10</p>	<p>(Index) W.H.</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>		

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Reference: FO 371 / 61794					

142

5) c g staff
c.o.
M/Ref
Mr Duke Cab Offs.
Nov 18.

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Reference: **FO371/61794**

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~~Secret~~
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~~Open~~

CYPHER

Despatched

Draft.

To: Cairo 2110
Baghdad 1012
Jedda 466
Amman 498
Beirut 705
Damascus 578
Telegram. Washington

No.

(Date) Nov: 14, 1964

Repeat to :—

British Middle East
Office, Cairo
~~Washington~~ 815

U.K. Delegation
New York
3926

Eg - Dept of Justice

J. S. Beins
Nov. 11

En Clair.
Code.
Cypher.

Distribution :—

~~Cabinet~~

Dip. Secret

Copies to :—

Chief of Staff
C.O.

Mr. J. J. Deane

The Secy (Cabinet
Office)

IMPORTANT

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Withdrawal from Palestine.

Defence Committee have ~~approved~~

recommendations in the following terms, submitted to them by the Official Committee on Palestine, regarding the attitude to be adopted towards Arab governments on various problems arising out of British withdrawal from Palestine: -

(a) His Majesty's Representatives in Arab States should take every opportunity of pointing out to Arab Governments that, so long as we are responsible for the administration of Palestine, intervention, whether direct or indirect, is tantamount to action against us.

(b) ~~Our~~ Military Missions in Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be maintained, but should refuse to take part in operations or training specifically designed for armed intervention in Palestine.

(c) ¹ Delivery of any equipment already ordered by Arab Governments should not be withheld or postponed, but any further orders should be carefully scrutinised. The position should be reconsidered if Arab armies should actually become involved in fighting.

(d) Before the termination of the civil administration in Palestine, the Transjordan Frontier....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

13556) W4. 43697-140 100m 3/47 G.S.St. Gp 620

145

Frontier Force should be disarmed and
disbanded, and the Arab Legion withdrawn.

(e) King Abdullah should be

(i) informed regarding the withdrawal
of the Arab Legion from Palestine
and, as a matter of courtesy, of
the intention to disband the
Transjordan Frontier Force;

(ii) warned that, if the Arab Legion
becomes involved in hostilities
in Palestine, His Majesty's
Government would have to review
the arrangements for the payment
of the subsidy payable under the
Treaty of 1946, and for the
secondment of British officers.

2. You should act on lines/(a) above.

~~For Jeddah and Bagdad only~~ HMRR at Bagdad and Jeddah

You should also give appropriate guidance to Br.

military mission on the lines of (b) above. HM

3. Action to be taken as regards (c) above

is being discussed with H.M. Minister at Amman
you. [to Amman only]

and this decision should be kept confidential
for the time being.

3. For Washington only:

You should inform Mr. Henderson
at the State Dept of the substance
of the above and of my tel no 397 to New York

397
JFV 5014

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61794

146
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

SECRET
Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO NO. 2110
BAGDAD NO. 1012
JEDDA NO. 468
AMMAN NO. 498
BEIRUT NO. 705
DAMASCUS NO. 578
WASHINGTON NO. 11795

14th November, 1947.

D. 2.15 a.m. 15th November,
1947.

Repeated to : British Middle East
Office, Cairo, No. 815
United Kingdom Delegation,
New York, No. 5916

IMPORTANT

SECRET

Withdrawal from Palestine.

Defence Committee have reached recommendations in the following terms, submitted to them by the Official Committee on Palestine, regarding the attitude to be adopted towards Arab Governments on various problems arising out of British withdrawal from Palestine:-

(a) His Majesty's Representatives in Arab States should take every opportunity of pointing out to Arab Governments that, so long as we are responsible for the administration of Palestine, intervention, whether direct or indirect, is tantamount to action against us.

(b) British Military Missions in Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be maintained, but should refuse to take part in operations or training specifically designed for armed intervention in Palestine.

(c) Delivery of any equipment already ordered by Arab Governments should not be withheld or postponed, but any further orders should be carefully scrutinised. The position should be reconsidered if Arab armies should actually become involved in fighting.

(d) Before the termination of the civil administration in Palestine, the Transjordan Frontier Force should be disarmed and disbanded, and the Arab Legion withdrawn.

(e)

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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147.

(c) King Abdullah should be -

(1) informed regarding the withdrawal of the Arab Legion from Palestine and, as a matter of courtesy, of the intention to disband the Transjordan Frontier Force;

(2) warned that, if the Arab Legion becomes involved in hostilities in Palestine, His Majesty's Government would have to review the arrangements for the payment of the subsidy payable under the Treaty of 1946, and for the secondment of British officers.

2. You should act on lines of (a) above. His Majesty's representatives at Bagdad and Jeddah should also give appropriate guidance to British Military Mission on the lines of (b) above. His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo should take similar action while British Military Mission to Egypt remains in existence.

3. Action to be taken as regards (c) above is being discussed with His Majesty's Minister at Amman separately you [to Amman only] and this decision should be kept confidential for the time being.

3. [For Washington only.] You should inform Mr. Henderson at the State Department of the substance of the above and of my telegram No. 3917 to New York.

MM

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61794

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10791

1947

PALESTINE

18 NOV

148

Registry
Number

E10791/46/51.

FROM

Chancery

No.

Washington

Dated

15/347/47.

Received
in Registry8 Nov
18 -

Visit to Palestine, Mr. Henry Wallace.

On Nov 5 Mr. Henry Wallace addressed a gathering of the Progressive League of America on subject of his recent visit to Palestine. He paid tribute to the Jews in Palestine and said that the development of a Jewish Palestine would benefit the entire Middle East.

Encloses article by Mr. Wallace, which appeared in the "New Republic".

Last Paper.

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BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

8th November 1947

Ref: 15/347/47

Dear Department,

On November 5th Mr. Henry Wallace addressed a gathering of the Progressive Citizens of America on the subject of his recent visit to Palestine.

2. After paying tribute to the achievements of the Jews in Palestine, Mr. Wallace said, according to the press, that the development of a Jewish Palestine would benefit the entire Middle East. He stressed the need for a Jordan Valley Authority to provide cheap industrial power. This would require the co-operation of both Arabs and Jews, as well as the assistance of the World Bank and the provision of a large amount of capital from the United States.

3. He had found no expectation in Palestine that there would be a serious conflict between Jews and Arabs once partition was an accomplished fact. He thought that, failing action by the United States, King Abdullah might possibly move into Arab Palestine, but there was no indication of an invasion of the country either from the north or from the east. He said that he had called upon King Abdullah and had appealed to him to co-operate in an ambitious programme to raise the Arab standard of living, but he did not give the King's reply. He added, however, that King Abdullah was planning to visit the United States in a year or two to seek aid for developing the port of Aqaba as an outlet for grain exports.

4. We enclose herein an article by Mr. Wallace about his visit which has appeared in the "New Republic".

We are sending copies of this letter to Jerusalem and to the United Kingdom Delegation at New York.

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY
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tion no amount of US dollars can make Europe self-supporting.

4. Legislation authorizing the Administration to stimulate the added production by expansion loans to industry or, if necessary, by building plants for lease or direct operation.

The present crisis arose out of inadequate national planning. Marshall "plans" and temporary economic controls won't prevent a next time.

Truman should have the courage to tell Congress and the country this, and keep reminding them of it. His own

Council of Economic Advisers, bulwarked by a labor-industry council to assist it, could fill the planning role temporarily—if Truman were not afraid to try something so "socialistic." Fear this time will produce bad politics as well as bad statesmanship.

HENRY WALLACE

First Impressions of Palestine

WHEN Abraham settled near Hebron he heard the voice of his Master, "Lift up now thine eyes and look from the place where thou art northward and southward and eastward and westward. For all the land which thou seest to thee will I give it, and to thy seed forever." Four thousand years later, in an earth transformed, Palestine is still the crossroads of the world.

Nowhere do the religious and economic, social and political forces dominating our lives meet with such impact. Here, in the space of a few bare hills and valleys, the three great monotheistic religions took shape; here today great nations strive for influence; here an old way of life can be seen crumbling as a new way of life arises. I believed before, and now I know, that a knowledge of Palestine is essential for a true understanding of the world today.

The sense of history alone—which is so important for an understanding of current problems—is overwhelming here. No one of Christian or Jewish ancestry can come to Palestine today without feeling a deep emotion. In our 44-hour flight from New York to Jerusalem, we touched ground at Rome, Athens and Cairo, ancient centers of civilizations which had influenced one another and left an indelible mark on every human being alive. Yet the most powerful force in history has been the concept of God and of social justice, which through ancient Judea came to life in this extraordinary land. And for many of the same reasons that made this country a great religious center, Palestine for centuries has been the focal point for conflicting political forces. How skillfully ancient Israel and Judea had to balance off Egypt against Assyria and Babylon! Just so, today, Jews and Arabs must find a

means of living in peace in a tiny country beset by great powers battling for its strategic areas and the nearby oil reserves.

Standing with a bearded, brown-robed Franciscan, the Reverend Brother Cammillus Liska, on the bell tower of Terra Santa Convent, I looked across to the old city of Jerusalem sloping down into the valley at Kedron. We had climbed up from the cave where Christ was born, and on one of the terraced slopes beneath us Brother Liska pointed out the fields where the shepherds had watched their flocks by night. Close by, he added, was the farm of Boaz, the grandfather of Jesse and the great-grandfather of David.

Fifteen miles away and more than 3,000 feet below us, we could see the

Jordan Valley and the shores of the Dead Sea and on its far side the Moabite Hills of Transjordan where King Abdullah rules today.

From those hills came Ruth with Naomi. And looking at the barren slopes, I thought of Ruth trying to gather enough wheat behind the reapers to keep her mother-in-law alive.

I thought of the parable of the sower, when Christ spoke of the seed in the good ground yielding one-hundredfold, sixtyfold, or thirtyfold. Wheat probably originated in the Palestine vicinity, and yet no wheat-growing country yields as little as Palestine today. These hills only produce six bushels of wheat per acre, 30 percent of the yield of the US and scarcely 10 times the yield in Christ's time.

David tended sheep in these same Bethlehem hills where his great-grandmother Ruth gleaned the wheat. And David's descendant, Joseph, driven by a census law of Caesar Augustus, brought Mary here from Nazareth



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to give birth to Christ only a few miles from where his ancestors had lived. As I looked out over these hills and thought of the Nativity, the Twenty-third Psalm became very real.

City has been built on city since then, but in many ways life has not changed. Within the walls of old Jerusalem we walked through the Arab bazaars where, between narrow walls overhung with sackcloth, butchers, bakers, barbers and merchants sell their goods, children play, men in rolled-up trousers tread oil from the sesame seed in vats and work at underground forges, while goats and donkeys pick their way through noisy crowds. Later we visited the Mosque of Omar, the tomb in the rock and the Wailing Wall, the last vestige of the glory of Solomon's kingdom, against which the Jews stand lamenting and praying.

Much as I enjoyed visiting holy places and would have appreciated the time to investigate nearly every square mile of Palestine with an eye to making the geography of the Bible come alive, I had to remind myself forcibly that I had come here to see how the Jew and Arab, working together under the aegis of an international settlement, could make this land what destiny must have marked it for—a cornerstone of world peace.

We had left New York with Palestine in the headlines of New York newspapers. That headline tension accompanied us as we crossed half the world. It was to be found in every newspaper—French, English, Italian—that we picked up on the way. When we put foot on Palestine's soil at Lydda Airport, 40 minutes from Jerusalem, we were greeted by William Porter of the American consulate. He told me that publication in a local paper of part of a speech of mine supporting the United Nations partition plan had led the British here to order an armed guard to convoy us to Jerusalem. Yet with all the headlines, with all the stories of Arab troops at Palestine borders and of the devious political maneuvering among various UN subcommittees on the Palestine question, as I write today I find among the Jewish population little of the tension I had been led to expect. If I were to sum up the general state of mind among the Jews with whom I've spoken so far, it would be as follows:

There's no hysteria. They face the facts as they are. They know there is still a long road ahead for a Jewish



DRAWINGS COURTESY THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA
DR. CHAIM WEIZMANN

state which, it should be pointed out, is not conceived as a theocracy but as a democracy with full citizenship rights regardless of race, religion or national origin. They are convinced that there must be a solution—and soon. They are not happy about partition. But if partition is the only way to achieve a Jewish state—even the state envisaged in the UNSCOP majority report, which is far smaller than that for which they have struggled so long—then partition must be accepted. They recognize the difficulties before them, but everywhere there's confidence that things will be worked out—that they must work out. There is an indomitable determination among them to go forward. They cannot conceive of failure.

If partition is achieved, what, in outline, will be the character of this

first Jewish state in nearly 2,000 years? In so far as it will reflect the social philosophy of its present leaders, I believe that it holds out great hope for the entire world.

The outstanding Jewish leader today is, of course, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the chemist and statesman who may well be its first president. Before leaving New York I lunched with him and was again impressed by his tolerance and breadth of understanding. This same spirit of understanding, it seems to me, is found among the Jews of Palestine, who appear more appreciative of the problems of the Arabs and the British than a good many of us who look at the scene from thousands of miles away.

If Weizmann the scientist is to be the first president of the Jewish state, David Ben-Gurion, the worker, may well be its first Prime Minister. He and the others like him who have pioneered on the land represent, I am sure, the burning conviction so prevalent in Palestine today: that man can achieve his will. Ben-Gurion is chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the elected body of world Zionism established under the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, which deals with such executive and legislative problems as Jewish immigration, land purchase and financing, and the political struggle for a Jewish state.

In Palestine today the workers in factories and on farms are the most highly respected of groups. The desire of students is to work with their hands and it is their drive to return to the soil—a contradiction of the general belief that Jews always move from the land to the city—which so marks the Jewish rebirth in Pales-

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tine. Ben-Gurion came to Palestine to be a laborer. Like others who came here after the turn of the century, he brought the conviction that the Jewish people could build a nation only by their own manual toil. He came at a time when many doubted the ability of the Jews to adjust to an agricultural existence after having been forced for centuries largely into the role of tradesmen. Today new thriving cities and settlements cut out of the wilderness vindicate the faith they held.

So far on this trip I have not had an opportunity to study city life here, but my experiences in agricultural settlements have been most enriching and stimulating, and testify to an extraordinary job of modern pioneer farming.

From Palestine's more than 600,000 Jews, some 120,000 are now on the land, in small holders' settlements or in farming villages. About 40,000 live in Kibbutzim, or collective settlements, in which no wages are paid; the members work collectively, live collectively and collectively own all they possess.

The first of those I visited was Bet Haarava—house of the wilderness—situated 1,200 feet below sea level off the northern shore of the Dead Sea. Plagued by insects and by the problems of the heavily laden salt waters and a soil already strongly alkaline, with a summer climate even hotter than that of Phoenix, Arizona, some 190 members of this Kibbutz have enthusiastically set out to make a wilderness into a paradise. They've washed the alkali out of the soil and built a good irrigation system. With an almost unlimited water supply from the River Jordan, they are hampered somewhat by inadequate capital investment, so that it costs them more than \$35 per acre annually to bring water to the land, which does not include the cost of washing the land. As a result, the members have assumed a debt which means an annual interest charge of \$8,000. At the moment the proceeds from the sale of their crops, milk, eggs, plus the carp they breed in ponds filled with Jordan water, aren't enough to meet such a heavy financial burden. Consequently more than half the members are working in a nearby potash-evaporating plant where the Dead Sea yields up a pure grade of muriate from potash at lower cost than anywhere else in the world.

David Coronel, a bespectacled young man who is secretary of the Kibbutz, told me that aside from the wages

brought in by potash workers, their greatest single source of income is from the sale of the carp, which are fed on cottonseed meal and sour milk, a by-product. "We get one pound of carp out of each one and a half pounds of seed thrown into the water," he said. He added that Jordan water contains considerable plankton, a minute form of algae which serves both as an appetizer and a vitamin for the fish, speeding their growth at a low cost. Later I toured the fields and banana plantation of the Kibbutz. Greatly impressed with their spirit, intelligence and knowledge, I came away from my visit feeling that there is a great body of agricultural knowledge which can and must be made available to these pioneers so they may ease their work, diversify their crops and revitalize their soil with a minimum of disappointment.

They have already made use of new techniques for the proper development of the land they have reclaimed. They are using all the scientific knowledge they can get. Those of us who know that the land is our most precious resource should give these extraordinary people even more assistance.

I thought they had done especially well with their cattle. Their cows are produced by crossing Holsteins from Holland with the red-and-white disease-resistant Damascus breed. Considering the hot summers, I thought an average record per cow of 9,500 pounds of milk annually was exceptionally good. They have no pasture and depend exclusively on green soilage crops, grain and oilcake, which, incidentally, sells for less here than in the United States. Later we visited a communal eating hall, where, at long wooden tables, we were served cake and fruits from the field.

Just before we left, Eli Ostrovsky, one of the settlers, summed up the work of Bet Haarava in brief, memorable words:

"Please understand. We don't want to take land from others. We want to build land. What we are doing here is using land that has never been used before. All we ask is the opportunity to be like any other people anywhere else in the world."

It is this spirit which is my strongest first impression of modern Jewish Palestine. I am impressed with the willingness to work, the eagerness to apply science to the solution of human problems and the atmosphere of great courage in facing the most difficult problems of nature.

H. W.



DAVID BEN-GURION

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FIGHT FOR LIFE AT QUINCY

The four-month-old struggle at Bethlehem Steel's mammoth shipyard is testing union solidarity—and the Taft-Hartley Act

by James Higgins

OUTSIDE the gates, pickets Arthur Boyson and Lefty Anderson heard a sound that shocked them—the rattle of an air-driven chisel against steel. It was the first noise out of the great shipyard in four months. Pickets had counted 32 scabs that morning—32 scabs now added to a force of about 260 “leadingmen” and foremen who had never belonged to the union and who had reported at the yard throughout the shutdown. Did the sound of the chisel mean that work was being resumed on the cruisers *Des Moines*, *Salem* and *Northampton*, which had been sitting like monuments to war since the men left them behind at midnight on June 26?

Boyson chinned himself on the fence. He saw a leadingman holding a chisel in a chipping gun against a steel plate. The plate was scrap, good for nothing. The maneuver was just a scare for the pickets.

Their own language. Boyson hollered and the leadingman looked at him, grinned, put the air gun down, waved and walked away to join a group of his buddies pitching horseshoes. Silence returned to the Quincy, Massachusetts, Fore River shipyard owned by Bethlehem Steel, where 2,600 members of the IUMSWA-CIO (Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America) are taking part in the most critical CIO struggle since the bloody Little Steel strike of 1937. The 2,600 are among 40,000 IUMSWA members outside the gates of nine Bethlehem yards and one US Steel yard.

Their struggle is critical for one big reason: here for the first time union workers are feeling the malignant spirit of the Taft-Hartley Act. Political apologists for the Act say they have no desire to break unions. William “Tubby” Collins, affable Bethlehem

vice-president who ran Fore River during the war, says the same thing. “The sole objective [of the company],” Collins declares, “is sound, efficient peacetime operation of its shipyards.”

From the prosperous days of jaunty Charley Schwab, Bethlehem has had a labor language all its own. “Efficient peacetime operation” translated into Bethlehem lingo means the kind of company unionism symbolized by the ERP (Employee Representation Plan) created at Fore River in 1923. This plan was never liquidated, until the IUMSWA licked the ERP (then disguised as an “independent union”) in a 1945 labor-board election. At that time the key shipyard in the Bethlehem chain automatically entered the “master agreement” which the IUMSWA had already negotiated for six other Bethlehem Atlantic Coast yards. The current struggle concerns proposed Bethlehem changes in this agreement. Bethlehem demands:

☐ Reduction of the bargaining unit in defiance of National War Labor Board directives covering certain “fringe” shipyard groups such as guards and working leaders;

☐ Authority for the company to maintain a pool of workers—the traditional “blue-eyed boys”—outside of all seniority;

☐ Elimination of maintenance of membership;

☐ Check-off only as provided by the Taft-Hartley Act;


☐ A provision whereby stewards would be docked their pay while investigating any grievance;

☐ Readjustment of the *incentive* wage rate, that will probably have the effect of nullifying any increase in the *basic* wage rate;

☐ A concession by the union that “notwithstanding anything in this agreement” Bethlehem is to have final and “sole discretion” on: piecework rates, transfers and grievances not specifically noted in the contract.

A quiet pride. Six weeks after the men went out at Fore River, “Tubby” Collins addressed a meeting of the Long Service Club and told the men who had worked 25 years or longer for Bethlehem that they were “the backbone of the shipyard.” He told them the yard was open for their return to work. But two years of membership in Local 5, IUMSWA-CIO, had transferred most of these old-timers from ERP faithful to union men. Six weeks after Collins spoke, Local 5 had surrendered only 32 scabs to the company the workers call “Joe Beth.”

The average age of the Fore River



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very naturally, are fighting back in an attempt to improve their situation.

Revelation! Last week *Life* magazine, through novelist Hamilton Basso, charged the development of a Roosevelt "myth," like Lincoln's, and asserted FDR's true evaluation must wait on future historians. This theory makes an easy escape for former

Roosevelt-haters, but it should be noted that some eminent historians evaluated FDR in his own lifetime. In 1937, Professors Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry S. Commager, in their *Growth of the American Republic* (which the *Saturday Review of Literature* hailed at the time as "the best short general history of the US ever published"), shrewdly analyzed

and eulogized FDR's character and gifts—acumen, magnetism, scholarship, liberalism, audacity and courage—"qualities that perhaps no President since Jefferson possessed in equally happy proportions." That was a contemporary account. Even so, it's nice that Basso and *Life*, though late, have found out about the Roosevelt "myth." *Washington*

NEW REPUBLIC

HENRY WALLACE CABLES:

The Conquerors of the Negev

Jerusalem (by wireless)

I HAVE TRAVELED the length and breadth of Palestine, living on its farms, working in its fields and talking to its workers, its businessmen, its political leaders, both Jew and Arab. From the vivid experience of these crowded days I've learned a new and powerful argument for the support of Jewish efforts in Palestine. It is that here in Palestine Jewish pioneers are building a new society.

In day-to-day effort and sacrifice they're learning new lessons and proving new truths for the benefit of all mankind.

It's no accident that this is taking place in Palestine. In two generations, if present trends continue, Palestine may be one of the loveliest garden spots of the world.

How forbidding the physical barriers to human settlement in Palestine appear today! In stifling heat we drove through the valley of the Dead Sea, 1,200 feet below sea level, yet here were men working in the noonday sun and waving to us as we passed. Our car wound up rocky hills miles from water, where only goats nibbled at bare earth, yet here were men clearing away stone. We drove across the hot wasteland of the Negev. Dust raised by our car made the settlements we visited invisible for several minutes after we arrived, yet out of the dust came smiling young men and women to shake our hand and bid us "Shalom."

In once barren sand dunes we bent under the

branches of orange trees laden with fruit. In northern Palestine, where the River Jordan flows into Lake Huleh, we stepped into a small boat and headed into the interior of the great Huleh Swamp. Pelicans, herons and hundreds of other birds rose up before us. We pushed our way through a narrow channel overhung with Egyptian papyrus, and later jumped out upon a black peat bog which shook under our footsteps. Farmers of this region have for centuries been weakened by malaria—carried by mosquitoes bred in this swamp. Today the Jews are planning to drain and settle this entire area.

A people concerned with cash returns alone would choose easier fields of endeavor. There aren't any easy fields in Palestine. But the needs of immigration are desperate. As David Hacoheh, of Haifa, general manager of Solel Boneh, the Jewish labor movement's largest building coöperative, told me, "We measure costs not in dollars but in lives saved."

Under these conditions physical pioneering requires social pioneering. This land is beyond the power of the individual to tackle alone, so the Jews of Palestine are conquering it by the power of collective effort. In agriculture, industry and labor there are extremely exciting experiments in collective enterprises.

(Continued on page 10)



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WASHINGTON WIRE

THE AUDIENCE is rustling into its seats for the show. Behind the curtain you can hear the final thump of stage settings being put in place for SGA (Stop-Gap Aid) and ERR (European Recovery Relief). The lively overture of preliminary name-calling has begun. Soon the curtain will go up on the Grand Attraction.

A lot has happened—a whole lot!—since Marshall made his Cambridge

speech last June. The 16 nations met in Paris, Russia abstaining and keeping out her satellites. At the UN, Vishinsky made his speeches. Some 200 congressmen visited Europe.

And now, here we are, back again in Washington, with spotlights on the Capitol dome, to see what it all comes to.

The prospect of action seems far better than last June. Europe won't get what it asks, but it will get something, probably a lot. Much that is done will probably be done for the wrong reasons. But large-scale European aid seems likely. And the Administration has comprehensive plans for machinery to carry it into effect.

Fixing the blame. One of the first big rows will be over taxes. The President's Council of Economic Advisers says calmly, but emphatically, that taxes shouldn't be cut. Senator Robert A. Taft (R, Ohio) says they should be; Representative Harold Knutson (R, Minn.) is all ready to introduce a tax-cut bill when Congress meets, and he has the support of his precious Business Advisory Group. To this emotional column the proposal to cut taxes, at this juncture, in the face of current inflation and relief needs, seems little short of wicked.

For generations the GOP has claimed to be the party of Sound Money. Generally this has meant being the party of Big Business—which isn't the same thing. Sound Money would have meant retaining

controls on instalment buying, which were thrown off last Saturday. The Federal Reserve Board and Truman begged and pleaded to retain brakes on bounding consumer credit in the face of mounting inflation: the GOP Congress wouldn't hear of it.

Now comes the issue of tax cuts for the well-to-do at a time when there is already too much purchasing power.

This column gets a sort of intuitive feeling, through its pores, that the GOP is going too far for its own political good. Recent polls, certain local elections, and even an occasional editorial, indicate the general public is slowly beginning to put the blame for rising living costs on the Republican Party.

Heaven knows Harry Truman has not helped to clarify the issue. But right now the HCL is the biggest issue in America. Putting it all in a formula, blaming the HCL on the GOP would spell "Win" for HT in '48.

Fighting back. The Labor Department has finally succeeded in boiling down into one brief series of statistics the answer to the question, "What's biting labor?" Taft wants the unions to stop asking for more increases in wages. And the drive for the third big wage increase will inevitably come next year. Why? Because the factory worker is taking a beating from increased living costs.

Here's the story. The average factory worker with three dependents has seen weekly purchasing power decline till now it's below what it was in 1942. On September 1 he was earning \$47.61 per week, but in terms of 1939 buying power this was the equivalent of only \$29.58. Here are the yearly comparisons for the American worker's family, all based on 1939 prices: 1939, \$23.62 a week; 1940, \$24.75; 1941, \$27.67; 1942, \$30.96; 1943, \$33.30; 1944, \$34.89; 1945, \$33.08; 1946, \$30.78. Workers,



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HENRY WALLACE (Cont'd from page 4)

Almost 20 percent of the Jews in Palestine are engaged in agriculture, with approximately half undertaking problems in communal settlements of extraordinary social and economic significance. Others farm in traditional fashion, though their marketing co-ops are highly developed.

Communal settlements fall into three classifications: the first is the collective, or Kibbutz, which has a communal dining hall with individual rooms for members, nurseries and other special separate facilities for children. The Kibbutz is governed democratically through the town-meeting method. Members receive no wages. The only cash they handle is the annual pocket money each receives for a vacation or for special trips to the city.

The second type is the Moshav Shitufi, a modification of the Kibbutz, which attracts many of the farmers among Palestine's 30,000 Jewish war veterans. Here the work is done collectively on Kibbutz principles, but each member has his own home.

The third type is the Moshav Ovdim, in which the members own individual farm plots but use equipment and do their purchasing coöperatively.

At Afikim, a well established Kibbutz in the once malarial Jordan Valley, I was impressed with the attention given to individual needs. The Kibbutz was proud that it had been able to send its first student to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, paying his tuition and expenses. In these settlements I found the education of children based on agriculture and respect for the dignity of labor, but this emphasis did not mean that broader cultural developments were neglected.

While the teachers appreciate central planning, they insist on the right of adaptation to local conditions. A case in point involved the use of a standard arithmetic book in which one problem dealt with purchases at a grocery store. Kibbutz children of nearly grammar-school age have no knowledge of grocery stores because all their food is purchased and prepared coöperatively. They have no conception of money or the use of money. Even their parents see little cash the year around.

Afikim presented many aspects of communal living and the communal solution of problems. One of the interesting trends was combining agricultural development with light industry. This is common practice, for restrictions on the purchase of new land and seasonal variations in agriculture make the development of other income-producing enterprises practically

essential. A thousand Afikim adults cultivate 500 highly productive, irrigated acres and run a plywood factory which turns out products they claim are superior to American plywoods. Their machinery is modern—mostly purchased in the US and Sweden—but one of their home-built machines cuts labor in one operation by 75 percent over similar time in America.

Last year Afikim sent a member to the US and Europe to study manufacturing methods and to buy equipment. This year they are completing a quarter-million-dollar factory by studying these techniques. I wondered whether private-enterprise farmers or collective settlers contributed more to the development of new agricultural methods, and I asked this question of Ezra Danin, a third-generation Jewish Palestinian and a private farmer.

Danin, who has done excellent work turning sand dunes into citrus groves and has pioneered in fish breeding, said the collectives contributed more. "The individual farmer is possibly afraid to take responsibility for error, while in the Kibbutz decisions for adventures in new directions are taken by the membership, so the responsibility is shared," he said. "As a result, there is likely to be more progress along such lines in the Kibbutzim."

I saw this exemplified in a land-leveler developed by one Afikim member, Abraham Efratz. This is the best machine for leveling land quickly and accurately I have ever seen. It seems to me that the Kibbutz answers the canard hurled against mankind by some monopolist propagandists, that personal profit is the only real motivating force in society. Here was a man motivated only by a conviction, which I found so prevalent in the Kibbutz, that the welfare of all is the supreme goal and provides the only protection for the individual. Interestingly enough, the people of Afikim hadn't even considered patent applications for the leveler or for the plywood machine.

At each Kibbutz I visited I was impressed by the spirit of sacrifice shown by the older settlers as they urged us to do everything possible to see that DP's be released and sent to them. They know additional people mean a reduction in their own standard of living, but their sense of unity, their concern for their fellow man and their long-range view of the necessity for more settlers to develop the land urge them to sacrifice. Yet it is not a somber spirit of sacrifice; it is a spirit of joy, springing from their realization that they are rebuilding their ancient nation. Anyone who has seen a "Hora" danced, as I did at Kfar Giladi, a Kibbutz in northern Galilee, would feel this. Here I saw a group of young refugees linking arms in a folk dance which

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NEW REPUBLIC

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THE CASE FOR THE DEFENSE OF "THE 19"

by Bartley C. Crum

A FREE MAN has duties as well as rights. The primary duty of a free man is to prevent the abridgment of freedom, not only his own, but that of others.

That was the position of the 19 "unfriendly" witnesses who went to Washington for the so-called Hollywood hearings. Their primary desire was to protect the motion-picture industry and all the media of communications, including the press and radio, from political intimidation.

I am well aware that we live in a time of stress and strain and that many citizens of the United States wonder why those who were called as "unfriendly" witnesses answered the questions about their political affiliations as they did. To most Americans it is a simple thing to deny that one is a Communist, and to many it might appear that Congress should have the right to ask what one's political association is or has been.

An easy way. Those who insisted that the federal government should have no right to pass laws abridging the right to think what one wants to think (or to say what one wants, or to refrain from saying anything) realized that very frequently in a democracy a minority position is unpopular.

It would have been quite simple for the 19 "unfriendly" witnesses to have answered Chairman Thomas' questions either with a direct "yes" or "no." In my opinion to have done so would have meant a betrayal of the basic constitutional principle involved. As these persons clearly saw, the various House Committees on Un-American Activities have, for nine years, been whittling away the guarantees of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Their position can best be stated by recalling the remarks made by former Governor Herbert A. Lehman of New York, who, when asked to sign bills

Bartley C. Crum is author of the best-selling book, Behind the Silken Curtain. He and Robert W. Kenny are counsel for "The 19."



ALL AT TAXPAYERS' EXPENSE

outlawing a political party and requiring people to testify on their oath as to their membership or belief, said:

The greatest danger to democracy comes through gradual invasion of the Bill of Rights with the acquiescence of an inert people through their failure to discern that constitutional government cannot survive where the rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not safeguarded to every person, including those with whose political and social views or with whose association the majority may not agree.

It is clear that not one of the 19 artists we represented had transgressed the law morally or technically. Not one had engaged in any action contrary to the obligations of conscience and custom. Each one had demonstrated his complete loyalty to the United States of America.

Yet it was possible to disrupt their lives, to drag them to Washington at great expense and at great cost to their reputations, and to subject them to attempted "rule by accusation" rather than rule by law.

No thinking American would deny that the powers of congressional investigation must be maintained. Still, as United States District Judge Simon H. Rifkind said in New York on October 7, 1947, when he impaneled the New York Grand Jury:

Of late, we have witnessed the intrusion of other agencies, mostly congressional, into the field which historically has been the domain of the grand jury, agencies which likewise undertake to participate in this delicate business of

accusation. These agencies, including congressional committees, have no such tradition as that which sanctifies the work of the grand jury. . . . They are armed with no safeguards against the play of passion and the clamor of the marketplace. They have no rules of evidence. They have no rule of probable cause. Rumor, gossip and suspicion are all admissible ingredients in their deliberations, and no judicial tribunal stands ready at hand to curb excessive zeal, or to protect him who is entitled to protection under our laws. In my private opinion, that is a dangerous tendency. . . .

That which we have witnessed in Washington at the hands of a congressional committee is more than enough to make men weep. Every safeguard known to Anglo-Saxon law was disregarded. The vilest kind of vituperation, abuse, hearsay and bias was permitted to be entered into the records of Congress—and no challenge was permitted. Hearsay testimony, photostatic copies of alleged documents, unidentified, were all permitted to go into the records without challenge.

Who is on trial? It is my conviction, deep and abiding, that the ancient rule of our law is still sound—namely, that a society which fails to punish all the guilty is merely inefficient. Any society can survive inefficiency.

But a society which convicts innocent men without a fair trial, as was attempted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities in the recent hearings, practises injustice and tyranny. It brings into disrespect the democratic institutions we purport to cherish and, in doing so, runs the danger of forfeiting any moral claim to the loyalty of its citizens.

As Mr. Justice Douglas recently pointed out, the essence of democracy is that the majority voluntarily places a limit upon its right to compel an unpopular minority to bow to its will.

It is not "the 19" who were on trial. It was the Congress of the United States. It is they who must answer to the American people.

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
risers to a higher and higher pitch of emotion and warmth of communal understanding. There, too, I heard tales of personal history—stories of their difficult adjustment after years in concentration and DP camps. Some are physically marred for life, not to mention the concentration-camp numbers branded on their arms. However, psychological wounds are being healed in the midst of the great family which is a Kibbutz and by the healthful process of work on the land and the simple life.

Many of these children arrive as bitter, hostile, even dangerous, victims of persecution. At Kfar Giladi I saw a group of Greek and Turkish-Jewish youths who had completed two years of study, preparing to start new settlements. They were well adjusted, spirited youngsters, ambitious to build new, productive lives.

The problem of children detained in DP camps is far from a solution, since Jewish immigration into Palestine is limited to 1,500 a month. United States quota barriers and the failure of Congress to pass legislation to open our doors to the saddest victims of Hitlerism must weigh heavily on the consciences of all Americans who see these children. They have good stuff in them—as their work in the Kibbutzim has shown—and they are fine human material of which we should be proud. One lad at Kfar Giladi could not forget a paralyzing memory. In concentration camp he had called endlessly for his father. Finally a guard answered by throwing a small piece of soap to him with the taunt: "Here's your father. This is what we've made of him—something useful." That despite such memories they are becoming well adjusted, productive human beings is testimony to their quality.

The Kibbutzim, which would gladly receive thousands from the remnants of European Jewry, range from prosperous, well developed agricultural settlements to almost grim outposts which will, I am sure, one day flower as others have.

At Nahalal I visited a Moshav Ovdim and found a similar spirit of coöperation, mutual aid and self-respect here in this well planned, beautiful community. A private life is possible which is not afforded by the Kibbutzim. Individual farmers work separate plots of land and live in their own homes. Two major principles of the Kibbutz are adhered to, however. First, the land is owned nationally by the Jewish National Fund; second, it is forbidden to hire labor except to replace a member who is ill or called upon to render public service, because of the belief that it is wrong for one man to profit from the toil of others. The farmer and his family must do all the work on their plot, with the labor of children restricted by a compulsory-education program.



TEL-AVIV, A MODERN CITY THAT SPRANG FROM THE DESERT

But experimentation in Palestine is not limited to agriculture. A symbol of the experiments in labor and industry is the city of Haifa, a magnificent modern port whose population of 150,000 is almost evenly divided between Jews and Arabs. A Jewish mayor has a city council which embraces both peoples. Until recent months the possibility of real coöperation of Arabs and Jews was best seen in this delightful city. The city itself has been developed with scientific direction according to plans prepared by Sir Patrick Abercrombie, a city planner from Liverpool.

I toured Haifa with representatives of the Palestine Economic Corporation, an investment firm with 1,600 American stockholders, which operates through a number of subsidiaries and has invested heavily in Haifa housing developments. Through one of its banking subsidiaries, it has financed several Kibbutzim. Even capitalists in Palestine have a unique approach.

The PEC's philosophy is that of the late Justice Brandeis, who fought bigness and monopoly in the United States and wanted to see the Jews of Palestine avoid those evils. The PEC, seeking the utilization of the many talents of the refugees from Europe, concentrates on the development of small plants.

"We're seeking the development of industry in fields where knowledge is the principal raw material," one of the PEC-ers told me. One such development is an essential-oil plant in Haifa where skilled Jewish workers extract flavors from Palestinian and imported fruits and plants. Similarly, the skills of Jewish refugees have established Palestine as a diamond-cutting center.

Jewish labor in Palestine is organized into a unique labor organization—the Histadrut—with a frankly socialist orientation. One hundred and seventy-five thousand wage and salary workers, both industrial and agricultural, are members of the Histadrut, which is particularly noteworthy because of its operation of some of the major industries of Jewish Palestine through Solel Boneh. This is the largest road-building contrac-

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tor in the Middle East and performed valuable services for the Allies during the war. It runs transportation systems in Haifa and Tel-Aviv and intercity bus lines covering most of Palestine. It runs a rubber and tire plant, a glassmaking plant, a cement factory, etc. Members of the Histadrut own Solel Boneh, which is making major contributions to the development of the country.

The Histadrut operates on four principles reflecting its socialist philosophy and the spirit of the Kibbutzim. It believes in the national ownership of the land, self-labor on the farms, mutual aid and development, and purchasing and marketing co-ops.

The development of heavy industry in Palestine is retarded currently by the present political uncertainties and the lack of cheap power here in the heart of the Middle East, where American and British oil companies control more than 75 percent of the known oil reserves of the world outside of the USSR. Jews and Arabs are paying 68 cents an imperial gallon (five quarts) for gasoline.

I checked the costs of petroleum products with Sir Alan Cunningham, British High Commissioner of Palestine, a fine man with an almost impossible job. Even without the temporary tax imposed for repair work by the British after the terrorist bombings of refineries, cost per gallon is higher than in Britain itself.

Oil for power-producing Diesel engines is too expensive, and therefore the development of cheap power through a Jordan Valley Authority is an essential for expansion of the country's economy and improved living standards for Arab and Jew alike.

After spending several days examining the efforts of Jewish pioneers, we decided to visit the Arab city of Jaffa, whose mayor, an exceedingly fine young man, a graduate of the American University at Beirut, gave us our first vital contact with the Arab point of view.

Earlier I had visited with the Mukhtar, or mayor, of an Arab village and found that at the farm level there was not much concern about the Jewish and Arab conflict. It was quite another thing when we talked to the highly educated mayor of Larget, an Arab city in Palestine. It was he who expressed the opinion that Zionists, with their assistance from abroad, had established an economy which the country itself could not sustain if such assistance ceased. This view may have some validity, but the emphasis must be on the development of cheap power and tri-national irrigation projects which increase the potential and make possible an immense rise in the present living standards of the Jews, Palestinian Arabs and Transjordanians.

The greatest single cause of the Arabs' and Jews' not being able to get together has been that the Arabs are so individualistic and so unorganized that no one is able to speak for them. It was with the greatest interest, therefore, that we crossed the Jordan and called on King Abdullah, who for some years has been ruling as king of the newly born state of Transjordan. On the shoulders of this man more than of anyone else in the Middle East rests the responsibility of organizing the Arabs bordering on Palestine to enter the modern world.

I spent two hours with Abdullah and found in him one of the shrewdest intellects of the Middle East. Although he outlined the Arab case in terms completely unacceptable to me, he seemed to agree with my basic thesis that the paramount problem of the Middle East was to raise the standard of living of the Arabs rapidly by developing water and power resources.

The part of Palestine which most fascinated me and most irritated my traveling companions was the wide open spaces of the Negev. My companions considered it a desert. It looked to me like western Nebraska. The windblown soil was somewhat like that of western Iowa and the Palouse country of Idaho. Many people, even among the Jews, are skeptical about the profitable development of this area, but I am convinced that once water is made available, an hour of man-labor in the loessal soil of the northern Negev will produce a greater return in terms of crops and livestock than in most other parts of Palestine.

At present, the Negev is as sparsely settled as a so-called American desert in the time of our grandfathers. We drove along a hundred miles of pipeline that carries water from wells to settlers living under more rugged conditions than in any other place in Palestine. In one settlement I saw a strange phenomenon—a marvelous harvest of carrots, with a splendid young banana plantation only a short distance away. The carrots had been planted immediately after an excellent crop of potatoes. If the Jordan River Valley waters can be made available for this land, there is no reason why the Negev shouldn't support a population of several hundred thousands.

I liked the hearty spirit of the young people from Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, who after a year of preliminary training had come into the Negev to show to all Palestine that nothing is impossible.

The Negev demonstrated to me in an even stronger way than the rest of Palestine the extraordinary manner in which planning from above and individual initiative from below can be fused to promote the general welfare of a people who really mean business. No one can lick the conquerors of the Negev.

H. W.

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<p>E10797/46/C</p> <p>COB(47)138th Cond</p> <p>Pin 3.</p> <p>Dated 10 Nov</p> <p>Received 18 Nov.</p>	<p>Policy to Palestine</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p> <p>E10796</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p> <p>JB Nov. 20</p>	
<p>References</p> <p>E10542/46/C</p>		
<p>(Print)</p>		
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3.

PALESTINE

E 6.O.S(47) 138 4. London

10 Nov. 47.

(Previous Reference: D.O.(47)23rd Meeting, Minute 1)

THE COMMITTEE had before them the conclusions of the meeting of the Defence Committee held on 7th November, 1947 together with a draft telegram to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East informing them of the Defence Committee decisions, which had been prepared by the Secretary.

SIR FRANK SIMPSON said the decisions of the Defence Committee were generally in accord with the minimum conditions outlined by the Chiefs of Staff. It would now be necessary for the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, in consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine to work out a plan for the withdrawal of British forces. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff had already sent the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces a private telegram informing him in general of the decisions of the Defence Committee, and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces, as a result of this telegram had referred back a number of questions. General Crocker said there were three basic problems -

(a) When could responsibility for the prevention of illegal immigration cease?

(b) To what extent could the Canal area be used for staging British forces out of Palestine?

*1) Serv. Major [signature] m/1.
2) Gasler [signature]
3) [signature]
15.11*

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18 NOV 1947

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AIR VICE MARSHAL FOSTER said he agreed with the proposals made by the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff and said that it would be necessary at an early date for a personnel and stores shipping programme to be prepared in order to see that adequate shipping of both types could be made available within the time limit laid down by the Government. He agreed that the shipping aspect could not be usefully examined until the outline plan for the withdrawal had been received from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East.

Ø C.O.S.(47) 136th Meeting, Minute 5.

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SIR FRANK SIMPSON said he felt quite sure that the intention of the Defence Committee was that the civil administration and the armed forces should be withdrawn more or less concurrently from Palestine. He understood that the Foreign Office were not in agreement with this point. Nevertheless, he felt strongly that the Commanders-in-Chief, should be formally told that they could plan on this assumption. If there was any doubt about this point, he thought it would be most important to go back to the Defence Committee on it.

SIR JOHN EDELSTEN said he was in general agreement with the proposals of the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff and he was quite sure that the intention of the Defence Committee had been that the withdrawal of the civil administration and the armed forces from Palestine should be carried out more or less concurrently. He agreed that in the event of any dispute on this point it would be necessary to consult the Defence Committee again, but the practical solution to the problem could only be reached by the Commanders-in-Chief, M.E., in consultation with the High Commissioner, Palestine.

In discussion general agreement was expressed with the draft telegram and the amendments proposed to it.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Instructed the Secretary to despatch⁺ the draft telegram, as amended, to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East.

+ To be sent as COS(ME) 173.

pl. attach.

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TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

WARNING The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).

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TOO 111920Z
TOD 112125Z

MOST IMMEDIATE

From : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

To : G.H.Q. M.E.L.F.

Rptd : C.-in-C. MEDITERRANEAN

COS A

COS(ME) 173

11th November, 1947

Following for Commanders-in-Chief only from
Chiefs of Staff.

1. Defence Committee have agreed that, in absence of a settlement which His Majesty's Government would feel able to implement or to participate in enforcing, withdrawal of British administration and Armed Forces from Palestine should be completed by 1st August, 1948.

2. We, therefore, require from you, as urgently as possible, an outline plan for withdrawal of British Forces and stores from Palestine, using following decisions, also agreed by Defence Committee:-

(a) Evacuation of stores from Palestine may begin at once.

(b) Part of troops and stores to be evacuated may be transferred to Cyrenaica, on understanding that no substantial moves into Cyrenaica would take place until later stages of withdrawal.

(c) Provision of alternative accommodation for personnel and stores in areas to which they would be transferred has been approved in principle, on understanding that detailed estimates of expenditure involved would be submitted to Treasury. We would not require details in your outline plan, but you should include an indication of what construction and expenditure may be involved.

(d) It is recognised that it will be necessary to use Egypt as a transfer area and that this will mean that there will be periodical increases in strength of armed forces in Egypt.

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(e) Some of the stores may be concentrated at Rafa depot and we may have to retain whole of this depot, even though this meant maintaining a footing on Palestine territory.

(f) Planning should proceed on assumption that no troops would be left behind to protect the Holy places in Jerusalem.

3. In our following telegram we give you further planning guidance in form of relevant outlines of our re-deployment plan for Middle East forces.

4. Question of withdrawal of civil administration is being taken up with Palestine High Commissioner, with whom you should, if possible, discuss outline plan, and indicate your views on timing and method of withdrawal of civil administration as they affect military evacuation. Plan should allow for alternative contingencies; first, you should assume that civil administration would withdraw more or less concurrently with withdrawal of British forces; secondly, that there is a hiatus between withdrawal of civil administration and final date of evacuation of troops. After bringing the mandate and administration to an end, however, our forces would take no action except such as was directed towards their own withdrawal and the withdrawal of our stores, i.e. they would not be responsible for maintaining law and order (except as necessary for their own protection) or for any of the other normal attributes of government.

5. Policy to be pursued in respect of illegal immigration and on arrangements for disposal of illegal immigrants detailed in Cyprus, is to be considered further here. You should, however, give an indication of at what stage you will wish to be relieved of responsibility for military measures to prevent illegal immigration into Palestine and military factors involved in disposal of immigrants from Cyprus.

6. There are certain to be many points on which at present we cannot give you firm guidance. We recognise that you will need, where necessary, to include reasonable assumptions in your plan and we will help to the greatest degree possible if further guidance is required on any major issues.

7. Prime Minister is to settle the form and timing of announcement of decision recorded in paragraph one above. You should, therefore, treat this information with maximum security precautions and confine it only to those directly concerned with preparing outline plan.

CIRCULATION
D.C.O.R.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs..
Secretary of State for the Colonies.
First Sea Lord

T00 111920Z

C.I.G.S.
C.A.S.

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<p>W'ion</p> <p>64Y4</p> <p>Dated 18 Nov</p> <p>Received 18 Nov</p>	<p>Withdrawal from Palestine</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p>E10Y36</p> <p>References.</p> <p>E10Y36/46/G</p> <p>E10046/48/89</p> <p>(Print.)</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p> <p>N.A. ^{about} Sept. 20/11</p> <p>the user have been informed of our intent w.r.t. in this matter</p> <p>J. S. Davis</p> <p>Nov. 19</p> <p>L. P. L. Pyman</p> <p>19/11</p> <p>BAB</p> <p>19.11</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p>	<p>MTL</p> <p>20.11</p>	
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16 Nov 1947

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DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

D. 12.47 a.m. 18th November, 1947.

17th November, 1947. R. 8.30 a.m. 18th November, 1947.
Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation,
New York Saving.

SECRET

Your telegram No. 11795 and your telegram No. 3917 to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Withdrawal from Palestine.

The substance of these two telegrams has been transmitted to Mr. Ley Henderson. He informed us that United States policy, which has just been approved by Mr. Marshall, is to withhold any further supplies of "arms ammunition or other war materials" for Palestine or neighbouring Arab states so long as the present situation continues. This prohibition applies not only to Arab requests, but also to hints which have been recorded from the Jewish side. Outstanding export permits will also be revoked for any orders, the fulfilment of which might be possible before the Palestine question is settled.

2. The Arab states will not (repeat not), be informed of this decision but in the case of an outstanding Syrian order it may become necessary to inform the Syrian Government that the supply of arms by the United States will not be possible so long as the present unsettled conditions in the Middle East continue.

EEF

References

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Confidential
Cypher/OTP

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3917

D. 9.15 p.m. 14th November, 1947

14th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington	No.	11796
Damascus	No.	579
Beirut	No.	706
Bagdad	No.	1013
Cairo	No.	2111
Jedda	No.	467
Amman	No.	499

IMPORTANT
CONFIDENTIAL

~~Your telegram No. 3085 [of 27th October: supply of arms to the Syrian Government].~~

Items mentioned in Damascus telegram No. 470 represent military equipment which Syrian Government asked us many months ago to supply, and release of all items was agreed as long ago as July and August.

2. Our policy as regards the supply of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon to whom we have no Treaty obligations, has been to assist these countries in obtaining what we consider to represent their minimum requirements of arms for the maintenance of internal security. We have at the same time been anxious that they should not accumulate any surplus supplies for the very reason that, in the event of serious disturbances in Palestine, they might find their way there. Agreement to the release of equipment in question was given within the framework of this policy. (Washington compare my telegram No. 7160.)

3. For your own information, only outstanding commitments for the supply of military equipment to Syria are 567 pistols and 123 bren guns and possibly also 10 water trucks. It is also possible that small quantities of small arms and ammunition agreed for release to the Lebanese police have not yet been delivered. We have no outstanding commitments to Saudi Arabia. Any further requests for arms by these three countries will be examined very carefully with a view to ensuring that they are bona fide and not intended for use in Palestine.

4. As regards the general attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's Government towards Arab Governments and their armed forces on withdrawal from Palestine, please see my telegram No. 2110 to Cairo.

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1. PALESTINE - POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF
BRITISH ADMINISTRATION

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOSTER said that the Vice Chief of the Air Staff had received a letter from Air Chief Marshal Garrod drawing attention to the possibility that after the British withdrawal from Palestine, a Communist regime might be set up under the influence of Russia in the new Jewish state and suggesting that the U.K. Chiefs of Staff might ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to bring this possibility to the notice of the State Department.

SIR FRANK SIMPSON said the issue raised by Air Chief Marshal Garrod was one which had been under consideration for some time. He was sure that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were fully alive to the possible dangers and suggested that any approach to the State Department could best be made on a political level through Sir Alexander Cadogan.

AIR VICE MARSHAL FOSTER said he was in general agreement with this proposal and he undertook to make a suitable reply to Air Vice Marshal Garrod.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the statement made by Air Vice Marshal Foster and that he would be sending a suitable reply to Air Chief Marshal Garrod.

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19 NOV 1947

S/s Foreign Affairs

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TOP SECRET

Eastern Dept.
E10832

19 NOV 1947
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

1, 2, 3, 10,
C.O.S.(47) *141 st.* Meeting, Items *1, 11, 12, 13, 15.*

held *Friday, 14th. November 1947.*

An extract from the above
minutes is attached.

(Signed) D.C. STAPLETON.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

15th. November, 1947.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	1	1	1	1

Reference:

FO371 / **61794**

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173

We can reply that no further action seems necessary pending finalisation of our plans, and which point further considerations could usefully be given to publicity requirements.

[Signature]

23.11

Am afraid this has been held up for some days. Draft reply submitted

D. S. Beir
NW. 30

Spoken to Col. Waterfield, who has taken over Col. Haddon's work. He agrees that this matter is now dead

x SB Dec. 18

1	2	3	4	5	6
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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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WHITEHALL 5422

19 NOV 1947

E

CABINET OFFICE

GREAT GEORGE STREET,

S.W.1

18th November, 1947

REFERENCE: C.O.S. 1376/18/11/7.

TOP SECRET.

E-10866

174

Dear Burrows,

19 NOV 1947

I am writing further to my letter (COS.1134/10/10/7) dated 10th October, 1947 covering a copy of a telegram which the Chiefs of Staff had prepared to send to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East asking for their recommendations on action which might be taken to convince all concerned of our firm intention to withdraw from Palestine if an unsatisfactory solution was reached.

As I was informed that both the Foreign Office and Colonial Office considered it would be desirable to send such a telegram to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, it was therefore sent on 27th October, 1947 (C.O.S.(ME) 169).

-1-

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.....

I now attach a copy of a reply which has been received from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East (184/CCL), from which you will see that certain action has already been taken which may help to remove any doubt as to our intentions and that, on the whole, the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East seem to feel that no further action on their part is necessary. They consider that the best method of convincing both Arabs and Jews of our intentions is through the medium of the press and broadcasts, and they add that steps have been taken to this end.

The Chiefs of Staff would be grateful for the comments of the Foreign Office on the attached telegram in order that they may consider what reply should be sent to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Colonial Office (Mathieson) to give him an opportunity of commenting also.

Yours sincerely
Maddam.

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

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1	1			2	

Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

RECEIVED BY C.T.F.

IMMEDIATE

IZ. 4224
TCO. 170848Z
TOR. 171230Z

From : G.H.Q., M.E.L.F.
To : Ministry of Defence, London.

184/CCL. 17th November, 1947.

From Commanders-in-Chief for Chiefs of Staff.

Reference COS(ME) 169 dated 27th October.

1. Present indications here are that Jews and Arabs have accepted H.M.G. declaration on withdrawal. This is certainly true of the leaders of the Arab League and the more responsible Jews. Certain Palestinian Arabs may still be unwilling to believe in our sincerity, but they are of the lower orders and are not politically minded.

2. The following action however may help to remove any doubts as to our intentions.

- (a) Royal Navy. The only Naval holding in Palestine which cannot be surrendered at short notice is the Royal Naval Armament Depot at Haifa. We do not know of any alternative accommodation for the contents of this depot but if such exists we recommend that consideration be given to the early transfer of these stores.
- (b) Army. Review of all long term contracts, H.Q., Palestine have already reduced new contract for their H.Q. building from 12 to 6 months. Disposal of camps and stores, action to this end is being taken.
- (c) R.A.F. Long term projects such as rebuilding AQIR have already been cancelled, and Maintenance Units and certain administrative units will be withdrawn or disbanded. Move of equipment into Palestine is being strictly limited to necessities although such reduction in flow will not be obvious to the casual observer.

3. The steps recommended in para. 2 are unlikely however

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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- 2 -

to be apparent to the majority of the Arab population and we consider that the best method of convincing them is through judicious use of the press and broadcasts on Palestine and steps have been taken to this end.

CIRCULATION

TOO 170848Z

D.C.O.R.
Foreign Office.
First Sea Lord.
Message Control, W.O.
A.M.C.S.
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
Chief of Combined Ops Staff.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2	2	2	2

Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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Registry
No. E 10846/G

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

J.G.S.B.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

S.W.1.

November 1947.

TOP SECRET

178

Draft.

Col. Haddon
Cabinet Office.

(from Mr. Burrows)

I have not replied before to your letter of November 18th, enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East about ways and means of making clear our intention to withdraw from Palestine ~~pending~~ ^{as we were awaiting} a Defence Committee decision on the plan of withdrawal.

Now that it has been decided that we should stick to ^{the} original plan of withdrawal and endeavour to secure a postponement of the arrival of the United Nations Commission, it may be undesirable to commit ourselves to further dates until we see the outcome of Sir A Cadogan's negotiations at New York. There is, however, much to be said from the public relations point of view in announcing our intentions as regards the date for the termination of civil administration and the phasing of withdrawal as soon as possible. We hope that ^{it will be possible to make} ~~the Ministry of Defence would agree~~ to such an announcement as soon as we reach a satisfactory settlement about the arrival of the United Nations Commission.

Meanwhile ^{it} ~~anything~~ will be useful to give publicity to items showing that evacuation has actually begun.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference: **FO 371** / 61794

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<p>1947</p> <p>173 31</p>	<p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<p>E10895/G</p> <p>21 NOV 1947</p>
<p>E10895/46/G</p> <p>Cab of Cabinet Offices</p> <p>Received 20 Nov.</p>	<p>Labour requirements resulting from decision to withdraw from Palestine in Aug 1948</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p> <p>E10846</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p> <p>10 Nov. 22</p>	
<p>References</p>		
<p>(Print)</p>		
<p>(How disposed of)</p>		
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>25/24/11</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>WGH</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>		

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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TOP SECRET

2815/Q(Ops)1

Enver

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD AT QMG HOUSE AT 1100 HRS
14 NOV 47 TO DISCUSS THE LABOUR REQUIREMENTS
RESULTING FROM THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW
FROM PALESTINE BY AUGUST 1948

281 NOV 1947

180

Present: Major General R G Feilden
I D Roberston, Esq
J R McGregor, Esq
Major General Sir Eustace F Tickell
Major General W D A Williams
Brigadier J H M Edge
Lieut Col D G B Cuppage
Major W G La T Cockraft

VQMG War Office(Chairman)
Colonial Office
DF(c) War Office.
E in C War Office
D Nov " "
D Lab " "
Q 6 " "
Q(Ops)1 " " (Secretary)

1. The Chairman explained that a major accommodation and labour problem had arisen owing to the decision to withdraw our troops from PALESTINE by August 1948. He asked D of AP to give the planned redeployment of our troops in the Middle East after the withdrawal.
2. The D of AP gave the the redeployment plan as requested stating that our troops would have to be provided with accommodation in TRIPOLITANIA, CYRENAICA, CYPRUS and the SUDAN.
3. DF(c) confirmed that work on existing buildings can proceed and be paid for out of existing funds, but he would require an estimate of the expenses this year in getting new construction started.
4. The E in C agreed to produce this estimate.
5. It was agreed in discussion that the Foreign Office should be approached with a view to deciding whether it will be possible to use German PW volunteers for skilled labour in connection with the construction of this accommodation.
6. The Chairman then said that he had been asked to take up with the Commissioners of Labour in WEST AFRICA the provision of unskilled labour. He wanted advice on this before his impending visit to the Command.
7. The Director of Movements explained the problem of shipping WEST AFRICANS to the Middle East, but stated that there would be no difficulty in moving Supervisory Royal Engineer personnel from HAOR to CYRENAICA if required
8. The Chairman asked the Colonial Office representative to find out whether there would be any objections to his discussing the possible employment of West African unskilled labour in the Middle East with the Commissions of Labour during his visit.
The Colonial Office representative agreed to give the Chairman an answer at the next meeting on 21 Nov 47.
9. The Director of Labour pointed out here that Middle East were asking for an unnecessarily high proportion of British personnel to supervise African Labour. He was of the opinion that one or two officers and 3 NCO's per 1,000 was a fair proportion.
10. The Chairman then opened discussion on the possibility of producing unskilled labour from other sources than WEST AFRICA and it was agreed that MALTA was a possibility.
11. The Colonial Office representative agreed to explore this possibility and said here he would let the Chairman have an answer at the meeting on 21 Nov 47.

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E

10916

1947

PALESTINE

21 NOV

182

Registry Number } E10916/46/31
FROM Lord Salisbury
No. Hatfield House
Dated 11 Nov.
Received in Registry } 14 Nov
21

Palestine, H.M.G. Policy.
Refers to letter (E10043/46/31) regarding in debate
was directed to the cabinet paper sent after the
General Election - 1945. It states that at that
time there was undue delay by the Govt. in dealing
with the problems of the Middle East, & Palestine
had been tackled then the present deplorable situation
would never have arisen. But there seems at that
time to have been a lack of grip in the direction of
Policy by the Colonial Secretary.

Last Paper.

10895

(Minutes.)

References.

Egyptian Dept.

M. S. Beins
Nov. 21
(BEITH)

(Print.)

BAIR
22.11

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.) <i>10/10/47</i>	(Index.) <i>4/11/48</i>
----------------------------------------	----------------------------

Next Paper.

E 10953

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

E 10916

SAS

E
inter

21 3V

Hatfield House,

Hatfield.

Hertfordshire.

183

Eastern Dept.

Private and confidential.

14th November, 1947.

My dear Beverin, 10043/46/31

Many thanks for your letter of the 5th November. I am so distressed to hear that you have been disturbed by the passage in my speech in the Debate on the Address in which I referred to the policy of the Government in the Middle East. It was, of course, only one sentence in a speech which had inevitably to range very wide, and, for that reason, was perhaps unduly compressed. I certainly did not have it in mind to criticise the recent action of the Government in referring the Palestine question to the United Nations. As you already know from my letter to you, I was in full agreement with that course at the time it was adopted, as well as with the decision of the Government to make no recommendation in referring it, and I still believe that it was the right course for them to take.

My remarks in the debate on the Address were directed to the earlier period just after the General Election in 1945. Rightly or wrongly, I believe that at that time there was undue delay by the Government in dealing with the

P.T.O.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61794

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1947 174 31	Palestine EASTERN	E10953 /G 22 NOV 1947
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E10953/46/C

New York
3444
Dated 18 Nov
Received 22 Nov.

H.M.G.'s policy to Palestine: Nahum
Goldmann

Last Paper.
E10895

References.

(Minutes.)
See within
1. New York 3459 19 Nov.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
Copied to C.O.
Tel New York 4085 25 Nov
Rptd to W 'on 1215
8) C.O. ✓ 27 Nov
45) New York 4257 29 Nov
Rptd to W 'on 12370
Jerusalem

We have been waiting for the observations of the High Commissioner and of the Colonial Office on this telegram. The High Commissioner's telegram of comment will be found at Flag A and the Colonial Office have now informed me that Mr. Creech Jones has minuted this New York telegram to the effect that he is willing to "have good relations with anyone at the appropriate time."

It is clear from this minute by Mr. Creech Jones and from the Secretary of State's minute within that neither would wish to commit H.M.G. at present in reply to this approach by Mr. Goldmann. We cannot start bargaining with the Jews until we see how things go at the United Nations, and even after that we should wish to deal with someone who can speak with authority. The onus of responsibility must lie on those Jews who approach us to prove that they can carry out what they offer. We ought if possible to get off a reply today (see paragraph 6).

J.G.S. Beith
(J.G.S. Beith)
25th November, 1947.

(Action completed.) 25/26	(Index.) WJH
------------------------------	-----------------

Next Paper.

Tel. sent
JBMW.25

25.11
25.11

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Reference: FO 371 / 61794

186

See within

1. Palestine 2226

21 Nov

2. Tel Palestine 1904

20 Nov

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 2

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61794

Discussions with Jewish Representatives
about Palestine

The Secretary of State has minuted Foreign Office telegram No. 4085 to the U.K. Delegation, New York as follows:-

"I must be protected from any further dealings with Goldmann. Warn him to be careful."

I submit a telegram to the U.K. Delegation, New York. This will not catch the Minister of State, who duly left on Wednesday. The papers should therefore be seen by him on his return.

Mr. Beine

J.G.S. BEITH.
28/11/47.

Minister of State on return.

BAB

29.11

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

Eastern M/V
Cypher/OTP

E 10953/46/316 *S/S*
188
P R I S E C

NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3444 D. 8.54 p.m. 18th November, 1947
18th November, 1947 R. 3.15 a.m. 19th November, 1947

Repeated to Washington
Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE

Personal for Secretary of State from Minister of State.

GoLOMANN
Nahum ~~Gould~~ asked me if he could come and speak to me privately and informally today.

He said that he and Dr. Weizman and some of his other colleagues were most anxious to remain on the best of terms with the British Government after, as it was reasonable to assume, a plan had been approved by the United Nations. While he quite appreciated the reasons for your attitude of non-cooperation in the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, he anticipated from the statements that had been made and from what he knew of your mind, that this would not be a policy of impediment but would be a strict neutrality between Jew and Arab. He thought that on this basis it would be possible to have a good relationship between His Majesty's Government and the probable new Jewish administration.

2. He said that he had so persuaded his colleagues and some of them wanted him to proceed to London and seek an interview with you. However, he had been of the opinion that he should not seek such an interview until after a decision had been taken by United Nations.

3. He said further that he had told his colleagues that it was no use going empty handed to you with just a declaration of friendship. He therefore had been considering what he might offer, and although his studies were not yet exhausted, he thought that if such an interview took place, he could offer you an assurance that there would be no illegal immigration, at any rate affecting the areas in which the British were still in control during the interim period of our withdrawal. And that further, while he regretted he could not be certain that there would be no more terrorism in these areas, he thought it would be cut down to a minimum and

that/

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Reference:-

FO 371 / 61794

Asst Eastern

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1

190

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

22 NOV 1947

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3459

D. 4.51 p.m. 19th November, 1947

19th November, 1947

R. 10.23 p.m. 19th November, 1947

IMMEDIATE

My telegrams Nos. 3442 and 3444.

Name should read Nahum Goldmann.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

191 16
pw.
E 10953

75872/154/13/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 20th November, 1947. 14.45 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2907 Top Secret and Personal.

My telegram No. 2885 repeating to you New York telegram No. 3444 to Foreign Office.

Grateful for your very early comments on Goldman's proposals and especially on last sentence of paragraph 7.

Distributed to:-

R. 245
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Mr. Martin
Foreign Office

Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmes
Mr. Gibson
- Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

19218

E10953

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 21st November, 1947.

R. 21st " " 20.55 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2226 Top Secret.

Addressed S. of S.
Repeated U.K.D.E.L. for Minister of State
(S. of S. please pass as my No. 1615).

Your telegram No. 2907, reference U.K.D.E.L.

No. 202.

Ben Gurion is repeatedly expressing to me a mediation desire, though I must confess neither in their actions or their speech have the Jews world scarcely shown any realisation that it takes two to make a friendship.

2. (groups omitted) Goldman I would suggest it is worth (?group omitted) to point out, with reference to penultimate sentence in paragraph 3 of the Minister of State's telegram, that active co-operation against terrorism is something we expect as a right and not in exchange for some concession.

3. With reference to paragraph 7, the following are some more important terms on which we require guarantees:-

(a) The rights of any person in contract with the present Administration to be respected. (There have been indications that Jewish Agency are running a Press campaign

that/

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61794**

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that the right of purchasers of land in Haifa Harbour estate would be repudiated by a Jewish Government).

(b) The financial liabilities of present Administration in respect of area of Jewish State, including cost to Palestine Government of combatting illegal immigration and claims for damages caused by Jewish terrorists, to be assumed.

(c) Non interference with communications, particularly railways.

(d) The rights of His Majesty's Government in land and property held by (Palestine) and on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

(a) Liability for payment to Ministry of Food of cost of food import programme to which this Government will be committed to be accepted.

4. It may be considered appropriate to ask for extra military concession. Although I have not been able to discuss this question with Commander-in-Chief it has always seemed to me possible to come to some arrangement with the Jews to safeguard any stores which we have been unable to evacuate by 1st August and to arrange their evacuation later. I am clear also that as soon as present tumult and shouting has died down the Jews would be only too willing to give us any reasonable military concessions we want. It might perhaps be considered appropriate to mention some of these at the same time, such as (?policing) Haifa port, maintenance of aerodromes etc., no doubt Chiefs of Staff will wish to express their views.

5. I have dealt with illegal immigration in my telegram No. 2225 reported to U.E.D.E.I. No. 1614.

²⁵Correction being obtained

(Copies to Foreign Office for transmission to United Kingdom Delegation)

Distributed to:-

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194

R.243
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson
Mr. Beith

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Registry
No. E10953/46/4

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open

JGSB

Draft.

U. K. Delegation,
New York.

Telegram.

No. 4085

(Date) Nov. 25/46

Repeat to :—

No 12/55
Washington
Jerusalem

C. Concur

H. S. Benin
Nov. 26

EX-101

Index

Cypher.

Distribution :—

Diplomatic Secret

Copies to :—

Colonial Office
(Mr. Trafford
Smith)
Mannison

27/11

CYPHER 195

F. O.,

25 November 1947

Despatched 4 5 P.M.

~~SECRET~~
MOST IMMEDIATE.

Addressed to U. K. Delegation New York *tee*

No. 4085 *Nov 25* repeated for information to
Washington and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 3444 of November
18th: Palestine

Following for Minister of State.

It may well be desirable to have
discussions with responsible Jewish Represent-
atives sooner or later, but, as suggested
by Mr. Goldmann, this would not be appropriate
until after the United Nations proceedings
on Palestine have ended. There will of
course be a number of important points to
clear up (see Jerusalem telegram No. 2226
to the Colonial Office). Before we can
agree to receive Jewish Representatives, it
will be up to them to show that they can
carry out whatever they may offer.

2. *For your own info we*
we agree with the points made by
the High Commissioner in paragraph 3 of his
telegram No. 2226. As far as we can foresee at
present the points of particular importance
which will have to be discussed at some stage
are:—

- (a) illegal immigration
- (b) the safeguarding of any stores
temporarily left behind, and
- (c) military concessions.

mtls

25.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Wt. 43697-140 100m 3147 G.S.St. Gp 620

32/11

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Reference: FO 371 / 61794

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E 10953/46/G

SECRET

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

196

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4085

D. 4.05 p.m. 25th November, 1947

25th November, 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 12155,
Jerusalem.

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York
telegram No. 4085 of November 25th repeated for information to
Washington and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 3444 [of November 18th: Palestine].

Following for Minister of State.

It may well be desirable to have discussions with responsible Jewish representatives sooner or later, but, as suggested by Mr. Goldmann, this would not be appropriate until after the United Nations proceedings on Palestine have ended. There will of course be a number of important points to clear up (see Jerusalem telegram No. 2226 to the Colonial Office). Before we can agree to receive Jewish representatives, it will be up to them to show that they can carry out whatever they may offer.

2. For your own information we agree with the points made by the High Commissioner in paragraph 3 of his telegram No. 2226. As far as we can foresee at present the points of particular importance which will have to be discussed at some stage are:-

- (a) illegal immigration.
- (b) the safeguarding of any stores temporarily left behind, and
- (c) military concessions.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61794					
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No. E 10953/46/4

James

U.K. Delegation
New York

4157

29th Nov

Repeated
Washington
Jerusalem

No.

dated

Distribution
Diplomatic Secret

H. S. Bennett
Nov 28

Private Sec.

~~IMPORTANT~~
SECRET

Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New York
telegram No. 4157 of the Nov 29th
repeated for information to Washington and
Jerusalem.

My telegram No.4085 [of November 25th:
Palestine].

In case you or any member of your staff may receive a ~~similar~~ ^{further} approach from Mr. Goldmann ~~I should make it clear that~~ I do not (repeat not) wish to be committed to any dealings with Goldmann. ~~You should be very careful to avoid this.~~ you should be most careful to avoid committing me in any way to have dealings with him.

GAB3

29.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:

FO 371 61794

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

E 10953/46/G

Secret

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET
DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 4157

29th November, 1947. D. 5. 30 a.m. 30th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 12370
Jerusalem

SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation, New York telegram No. 4157 of the November 29th repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 4085 [of November 25th: Palestine].

In case you or any member of your staff may receive a further approach from Mr. Goldmann you should be most careful to avoid committing me in any way to have dealings with him.

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EW

Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3442.

D. 6.04 p.m. 18th November 1947.

18th November 1947. R. 11.22 p.m. 18th November 1947.

Repeated to: Washington,
Jerusalem,
Bucharest.

IMMEDIATE.

Nahum Gould told the Minister of State today confidentially that the illegal immigration situation was now generally under control. He assured him firmly that the ships at Constanca would not sail.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem and Bucharest as my telegrams Nos. 201 and 5.

[Copies sent to Bucharest and to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61794**

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1947 159	Palestine EASTERN	E10538 /G 11 NOV 1947
E 10538/46/G New York 3308 Dated 10 Nov Received 11 Nov	U.S. - Soviet proposal for Palestine: Comments of U.K. Delegation.	
Last Paper. (E10537)	(Minutes.) 374 See E10546	
References.	JB NW. 13	
(Print.)		
(How disposed of.) Being copied Tel New York 3875 12 Nov Rpt to 'on 11/11 Jerusalem. Tel to 'on 11/12 12 Nov Rpt New York 3876 P.T.O. Off. of the Secretary of State Mr. Caffery Smith		
(Action completed.) 25/11	(Index.) W.H.	
Next Paper.		

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